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INTRODUCTION

In 1911, the Supreme Court held that vertical price restraints were per
se illegal in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.' While vertical price restraints were the central restraint at issue in Dr. Miles, the
Court subsequently declared vertical nonprice restraints per se illegal as
well.2 Over the course of the last century, the Court has slowly departed
1. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
2.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1967). The
Court relied in part on Dr. Miles in holding all vertical restraints should be per se illegal,

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITYLA WREIEW

[Vol. 28

from the Dr. Miles rule in a piecemeal fashion, striking down the use of a
per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints in 1977, 3 and against vertical
maximum price restraints in 1997.4 While both cases seriously eroded the
use of per se rules in judging vertical restraints, they also reiterated that
vertical minimum price restraints represented a unique anticompetitive evil
and should remain per se illegal. 5
In 2007, the Court took up the issue of whether vertical minimum
price restraints should continue to be held per se illegal, or whether the
practice should be subject to the rule of reason just as all other vertical restraints. 6 The Court held 5-4 to overturn Dr. Miles and its per se rule of
illegality against vertical minimum price fixing, offering the final crushing
blow to the use of per se rules in judging vertical restraints.7 The primary
rationale of the Court was that per se rules are only appropriate if a practice
will "always or almost always" be found to be anticompetitive if judged
under the rule of reason.8 Thus, as contemporary economic analysis had
shown that vertical minimum price restraints may have some procompetitive uses, a per se rule of illegality is no longer appropriate. 9
This case note will argue that the Court in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. erred in overturning Dr. Miles and the per se
rule against vertical minimum price fixing. It will begin by offering a brief
overview of antitrust law in the United States and a concise discussion of
pivotal Supreme Court cases in the area of vertical restraints, beginning
with Dr. Miles. Next, the facts and procedural history of the Leegin case
will be introduced and a detailed discussion of both the majority and dissenting opinions will be offered. Following that, the majority opinion and
its shortcomings will be analyzed with an emphasis on the Court's misguided economic assumptions and its error in failing to give real consideration to stare decisis implications. Finally, the practical impact of the
Court's decision both on the market and on antitrust enforcement will be
considered.

though the Schwinn Court was careful to allow an exception to the per se rule for nonprice
vertical restraints when a manufacturer retained title to the goods sold. Id at 377-80.
3.
Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18, 59 (1977).
4.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18-19, 22 (1997).
5.
Khan, 522 U.S. at 1O-11;Sylvania, 433 U.S. at51 n.18.
6.
Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).
The rule of reason is a legal rule used by courts in analyzing whether a particular business
practice is an unreasonable restraint on trade, and thus should be held illegal. Sylvania, 433
U.S. at 49. The rule of reason requires the particular restraint at issue and its competitive
effects be judged on a case-by-case basis. Id.
7.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2709-10, 2725.
8.
Id. at 2717.
9.
Id. at 2714-17.
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II.
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

ANTITRUST LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW

By the late nineteenth century, the distribution of wealth in the United
States had undergone a dramatic shift and was largely centralized in the
hands of a small number of corporations and powerful individuals.' 0 It was
feared that if economic power was concentrated in the hands of a select
few, additional concentration of market power would naturally occur, and
would result in trusts that would use their power to "oppress individuals and
injure the public."" In order to preserve competition and ensure that further
concentration of wealth or power did not occur, Congress passed the
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.12
In passing the Sherman Act, 13 Congress did not intend to codify a
comprehensive antitrust law which provided judicial mandates that were set
in stone. 14 Rather, Congress intended to give the courts great power to interpret section 1 of the Sherman Act by utilizing broad language to which
the courts could give shape.' 5 Additionally, the very language "restraint of
trade," adopted in Section 1, was intended to invoke the common law tradition of antitrust jurisprudence, 16 and not merely to codify a static meaning
to which the common law had arrived by 1890. 17 In relying on these factors,
the Supreme Court has recognized that "the general presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the
Sherman Act ... . This reasoning has allowed the Court to alter antitrust
10.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50 (1911).
11.
Id. See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966)
("From this country's beginning there has been an abiding and widespread fear of the evils
which flow from monopoly ... ").
12.
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966) (stating that the
Sherman Act was passed to "preserve competition among a large number of sellers," by
ensuring that powerful business conglomerates did not further restrict the marketplace by
driving small companies out of business). It is important to understand that the Sherman Act
is primarily concerned with protecting competition and not with the comfort or survival of
small businesses, though these two goals may at times overlap. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOx: A PoLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 7 (Free Press 1993) (1978).
13.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
14.
See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
15.
See id. (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890) (statements of Sen. Sherman)).
16.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988)). For a history of the evolution of the term "restraint
of trade" in both English and American common law prior to the adoption of the Sherman
Act, see StandardOil Co. v. UnitedStates, 221 U.S. 1, 51-62 (1911).
17.
Khan, 522 U.S. at 21 (quoting Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 732).
18.
Id.
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policy when it feels that the rationale underlying a decision has been discredited, and to do so by giving far less weight to notions of stare decisis
than it would in other cases.' 9
At common law, the central concern of antitrust jurisprudence was
avoiding the development of monopolies in the marketplace. 20 "A monopolist is a seller ... who can charge the price at which his product will sell in
the market by changing the quantity he sells.",2 ' A monopolist takes advantage of the inelastic demand for its product in order to achieve a level of
profitability above that which would be allowed by the competitive market. 22 Thus, of primary concern to Congress in passing the Sherman Act
was promoting and protecting
consumer welfare by preserving free compe23
tition in the marketplace.
The rationale for protecting free competition rests on the premise that
unfettered competition will lead to the most efficient allocation of market
resources, thereby promoting low prices, product quality, and the overall
material progress of society. 24 However, consumer welfare may at times be
injured by unbridled competition; thus, free competition in the realm of
antitrust jurisprudence will only be protected insofar as it does not infringe
on consumer welfare within the market.25 This suggests that promoting consumer welfare through increased efficiency is the ultimate goal of antitrust
law, and protection of competition a secondary goal, which is often so
nearly aligned
with efficiency that it offers courts a reasonable baseline for
2
analysis.
While this approach is sound in theory, the problem is that consumer
welfare cannot be simply analyzed in terms of perfect efficiency as con-

19.
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705,
2720-21 (2007); Khan, 522 U.S. at 20-2 1.
20.
See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911) ("[Because] individuals by the abuse of their right to contract might be able to usurp the power arbitrarily to
enhance prices... it came to be that laws were passed relating to [such] offenses.").
21.
RJCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9 (2d ed. 2001).
22.
See id at 11-12. Inelastic demand is described as a point along the demand
curve where "a price at which the proportional reduction in the quantity demanded [of a
product] as a result of raising prices slightly would be less than the proportional increase in
price." Id at 11.
23.
BORK,supra note 12, at 61 (noting that the legislative history of the Sherman
Act reveals the "clear and exclusive policy intention of promoting consumer welfare").
24.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also StandardOil
Co., 221 U.S. at 58-59.
25.
See BORK, supra note 12, at 51.
26.
POSNER, supra note 21, at 29. See also BORK, supra note 12, at 7 (arguing that
courts have failed to give proper weight to the "crucial concept" of business efficiency in
antitrust analysis, which benefits consumers through lowering the cost of products and increasing the overall value of goods and services produced by society).
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sumers often have conflicting goals concerning the market.2 7 If perfectly
rational, consumers would seek to maximize market efficiency to achieve
low prices, and as a corollary, to increase the value of the market. 28 However, consumers do not act rationally and intelligently all the time. 29 Rather,
consumers have a myriad of wants and needs in the marketplace, which
cannot all be provided by a perfectly efficient market. 3 ° So the question
ultimately remains: how should the Court appropriately and accurately define consumer welfare? This question is key, as it lies at the base of judicial
decisions defining and outlawing "illegal" restraints of trade. 3'
If read literally, the Sherman Act would make any agreement that restrained trade illegal; however, courts have read the Act as only banning
agreements which unreasonably restrain competition.32 This is because
every restraint on competition restricts trade, but sometimes even an
agreement limiting competition may be beneficial to society in the aggregate.33 Recognizing this fact, the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States proffered that analysis under the Sherman Act required the
should be conexercise of judgment in each case and that such judgment
34
ducted under the standard of reason, or "rule of reason."
Under the rule of reason, the fact-finder must analyze all the facts and
circumstances surrounding an alleged violation of the Sherman Act in deciding whether the conduct in question is an unreasonable restraint on comSee Jean Wegman Bums, Challenging the Chicago School on Vertical Re27.
straints, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 605, 607-11 (2006).
28.
See id.
HUGH SCHWARTZ, RATIONALITY GONE AWRY? DECISION MAKING INCONSISTENT
29.
wrH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL THEORY

4-6 (1998) (arguing based on psychological studies

and empirical data that "economic behavior [does] not conform to the rationality that is
critical to mainstream economic theory").
See, e.g., Bums, supra note 27, at 607-11 (arguing that while most people would
30.
agree that they prefer to pay on dollar for an item as opposed to two dollars for the same
item, consumers also want, among other things, dealers to be treated fairly); Maria Pleyte,
Online Undercover Marketing: A Reminder of the FTC's Unique Position to Combat Deceptive Practices, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 55, 68 (stating that consumers may choose to yield to
their desire to be viewed as a part of the "in-crowd" over acting rationally in making a particular market decision).
See BORK, supra note 12, at 7 (noting that the Supreme Court has introduced a
31.
number of competing and conflicting goals in the area of antitrust jurisprudence); see also
infra Part II.B.
See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
32.
33.
See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1917); see also POSNER,
supra note 21, at 29.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). The Court held that
34.
the criteria which should be used to ascertain whether the Sherman Act has been violated is
the "rule of reason guided by the established law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the public policy which its restrictions were obviously enacted to
subserve." Id.at 62.
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petition on a case-by-case basis.35 Information about the particular business
at issue, 36 "the restraint's history, nature, and effect,, 37 and whether the
business in question has market power, 38 are all important factors to consider in judging a practice under the rule of reason. Weighing such elements
allows a court to distinguish between restraints that have anticompetitive
effects and those which
stimulate competition and are thus "in the con39
sumer's best interest.
The rule of reason was adopted to allow courts to carefully analyze a
business practice before condemning it; however, it is this goal that has
largely made analysis under the rule difficult in practice. n0 First, rule of
reason trials are incredibly costly to litigate, 4 1 and while most cases settle

35.
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). The rule of
reason is classically described in ChicagoBoard of Trade v. United States:
The true test of illegality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to
be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent -may help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917).
36.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
37.
Id.
38.
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tool Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (describing the rule of reason as involving "an inquiry into market power and market structure
designed to assess the combination's actual effect [on the market]").
39.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713
(2007).
40.
See Mark Crane, The Future Direction of Antitrust, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 14
(1987) (stating that courts need to consider all the consequences of an business practice
before finding it illegal in order to render a just decision and that such a requirement results
in a complex and costly rule of reason trial).
41.
Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of PrivateAntitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1016 (1986) (stating that an antitrust case costs a party approximately $200,000 to $250,000 to litigate, which totals approximately $250 million per
year for all private antitrust claims filed). See also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting that analysis under the rule of reason is often an incredibly complex
and prolonged judicial undertaking). Part of what makes antitrust cases so costly to litigate
is the significant length of an antitrust trial. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 367 (1967) (stating that the antitrust trial in the case at bar took seventy
days to litigate).
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before trial, 42 discovery and pretrial expenses in an antitrust suit are significantly high.43 Such high costs may encourage some defendants simply to
abandon a perfectly legal and socially useful business practice due to the
risk of losing at trial. 44 Second, the high costs of litigation and possible
abandonment of socially useful practices has a cost to society, which must
endure a less efficient market and ultimately pay increased prices to absorb
litigation costs. 45 Finally, analysis under the rule of reason may lead to
varying judicial results based on the same underlying facts, as the appropriate means and standards of analysis under the rule are largely indefinite and
unclear. 46 Such divergent opinions may also result from the complexity of
the economic data underlying antitrust cases.47 If most economists disagree
about the economics at the base of a case, judges, juries, and lawyers, many
of whomn only have a basic understanding of economics, cannot be expected
to render sound judgments.48
There are certain categories of business practices, however, which are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, and are thus judged to be illegal
without a substantial inquiry into their effect or the justification for their use
in a particular case.4 9 Such conduct is deemed to have such predictable and
harmful anticompetitive effects, and such a small likelihood of yielding any
42.
Janet L. McDavid, Using Alternative Dispute Resolution in Antitrust Cases,
ANTITRUST, Spring 1990, at 25 (stating that at least ninety percent of all antitrust cases settle).
43.
Crane, supra note 40, at 16-17 (noting that discovery in an antitrust case often
involves expert testimony, analysis of statistical data, and a significant number of documents, which substantially increases the pretrial costs of a case).
44.
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States
and Europe, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 427, 435-36 (2005) ("[A]n antitrust suit can entail
such high costs, and even a small possibility of paying treble damages can be so daunting
that the defendant is rationally induced to settle the matter by abandoning the challenged
conduct regardless of whether it was procompetitive or anticompetitive." (citation omitted)).
It has also been suggested that antitrust litigation or the threat of filing an antitrust suit may
be strategically misused by competitors to control competition. Daniel A. Crane, Rules
Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 49, 97-98 (2007).
Specifically, a less efficient firm could use the threat of filing suit to compel a rival company
to stop utilizing a more efficient business practice, or could motivate a more creative firm to
stop innovating. Id.
45.
See supra notes 23-25, 41-44 and accompanying text.
46.
AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW MONOGRAPH 23, THE RULE OF
REASON 102-03 (1999) ("[C]ommentators still condemn the [rule of reason] as indefinite and
unworkable.. . [T]he nebulous nature of the rule can lead to inconsistent results.").
47.
See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvardand Chicago Schools: A
New Antitrust Approachfor the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 351-52 (2007).
AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 46, at 103 ("Most economists do not agree on the
48.
competitive impact and consumer welfare effects of any given restraint. Thus, it is questionable whether different juries would yield consistent answers if presented with identical
facts." (citations omitted)).
49.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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procompetitive benefit in the vast majority of instances, that they are held
to be illegal per se.5 ° The fundamental difference between a per se rule and
analysis under the rule of reason is that in the case of per se rules, the Court
singles out a few key facts and makes them legally determinative of
whether the practice violates the law.5' This is far different from analysis
under the rule of reason, which allows for an "open-ended" inquiry of the
business practice in question.52 Per se rules offer a narrow exception to the
general notion that the conduct at issue in an antitrust suit should be analyzed under the rule of reason.53
Applying a per se rule of illegality is appropriate only "[o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with
confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it." 54 The Supreme Court is
reluctant to adopt a per se rule where the economic impact of a business
practice is not immediately obvious. 55 In deciding to adopt a per se rule of
illegality to address an anticompetitive business practice, the Court may
look to the surrounding circumstances of the market, 56 or the nature and
effect of the conduct in question.57 Mandating the use of a per se rule creates a "conclusive presumption" of unreasonableness, which for the sake of
business certainty and judicial efficiency, justifies the invalidation of a
small number of business practices that may have otherwise proved reasonable had they been judged under the rule of reason.5 8 While per se rules

5).

50.

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing N.Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at

51.
POSNER, supra note 21, at 39.
52. Id. The difference between the rule of reason and per se rules evidences the
difference in utilizing rules versus standards. "Rules are generally simpler and cheaper to
enforce than standards and provide clearer guidance both to the people subject to them and
to the courts that administer them. But they are often either underinclusive or overinclusive,
and sometimes they are both at the same time." Id
53.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2718
(2007).
54.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982). See also
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (stating that per se illegality is only reasonable when the practice at issue "would almost always restrict competition
and decrease output" (citations omitted)); FTC v. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59
(1986) (noting that a per se rule of illegality is not appropriate where the economic benefit of
a specific practice within a particular market is not immediately obvious to the Court).
55.
Khan, 522 U.S. at 10.
56.
See Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984).
57.
See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
58.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. at 344. Thus, if a practice is per se
illegal, it is completely irrelevant that the conduct at issue would be found legal in a fullblown rule of reason trial. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609
(1972).
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may provide administrative benefits, such benefits are not, without more,
59
sufficient to justify the creation or continued adherence to a per se rule.
In keeping with its common law tradition, the Court has at times recognized that adherence to a per se rule of illegality is no longer sound policy.6° The Court will strike down an earlier decision creating a per se rule if
it determines that the economic realities forming the basis for the decision
have changed, or if it finds that the Court based an earlier ruling on an inaccurate economic analysis. 6' The problem is, in analyzing whether to continue to adhere to a per se rule of illegality, the Court has failed to consistently subscribe to a single underlying policy goal, especially in the area of
vertical market restraints. 62
This conflict likely developed from the fundamental debate within antitrust law as to what exactly "consumer welfare" means and how it should
be protected.63 Legislative history suggests that the only true policy intent
of the Sherman Act is to promote consumer welfare by maximizing efficiency and fostering low prices. 64 However, analysis of the common law
shows that the Supreme Court's definition of "consumer welfare" stems
less from what is the right definition of consumer welfare than it does from
the needs of society right now. 65 While a number of scholars suggest that
the Court may only use the Sherman Act to protect commerce and not "to

59. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977).
60. See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S. at 18-19, 22 (holding that vertical maximum price
fixing was no longer a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act); Sylvania, 433 U.S.
at 51 n. 18, 59 (holding that vertical non-price restraints should no longer be judged as per se
illegal, but should instead be considered under the rule of reason).
61.
See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988); see also
Khan, 522 U.S. at 18 (overturning the per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing by
arguing, inter alia, that contemporary economic theory had undermined prior economic
justifications for the rule); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57 (holding that vertical nonprice restraints were no longer per se legal as economic analysis had showed they had procompetitive uses).
62. See infra Part ll.B; supranote 31.

63. See BORK, supra note 12, at 55-56, 61-66. This debate may also have emerged
from the conflict between two schools of economic thought which have earned judicial
respect in the area of antitrust law, the Chicago School and the Harvard School. See Piraino,
supra note 47, at 348-56. The Harvard School promoted consumer welfare by favoring per
se rules which ensured and fostered both judicial and business certainty. Piraino, supra note
47, at 349. Conversely, the Chicago School argues that the anticompetitive effects of a
business practice should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, an approach that sacrificed
certainty in pursuit of maximum market efficiency. Piraino, supranote 47, at 350.
64. See BORK, supra note 12, at 61.
See BORK,supra note 12, at 55 (stating that the Court has at times placed social
65.
and political policy objectives ahead of the "proconsumer traditions" of antitrust law); infra
Part l.B (explaining differing policy goals which have been pursued by the Court in shaping
antitrust policy in the area of vertical restraints).
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regulate the good order of society," 66 perhaps the vast majority of the time,
to regulate the market and society is to regulate one in the same. Ultimately,
the only certainty surrounding consumer welfare is that the tension over its
meaning lies at the base of every major Supreme Court antitrust decision
and will likely continue to be debated far into the future.6 7
B.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S VERTICAL RESTRAINT
JURISPRUDENCE

"A restraint-is vertical... when a firm operating at one level of an68
industry places restraints upon rivalry at another level for its own benefit.
More simply, a vertical restraint is a restriction placed on a seller by a
buyer, or vice versa. 69 Vertical restraints may be either price or non-price in
kind,70 and such restraints tend to be placed on retailers by manufacturers

in the vast number of cases. 7' At issue in Leegin was a particular type of
vertical restraint-vertical resale price maintenance (or vertical resale price

fixing). 72 Price fixing, according to antitrust jurisprudence, is any agree73
ment to fix "the range within which purchases or sales will be made.,

66.
See BORK, supra note 12, at 61-63. Bork explained that since the Sherman Act
was passed by Congress under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, that
under the Means/Ends test outlined in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), the Act
could only be used to control "commercial" acts and not to create social policy. BORK, supranote 12, at 61-63.
67.
See supranote 65.
68.
BORK, supra note 12, at 288.
69.
Murray S. Monroe, Vertical Restraints, 27 U. TOL. L. REv. 433, 433 (1996).
70.
See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37-39 (1977)
(ruling on the proper means through which to judge a particular type of nonprice vertical
restraint: the adoption of exclusive retail sales territories); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (dealing with vertical price fixing).
71.
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2710 (2007) (dealing with the use of vertical minimum price fixing by a manufacturer on
select retail outlets participating in a unique retail sales program); Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36
(concerning the use of territory restriction by a manufacturer against its independent retail
sales outlets); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 255 (1963) (involving the
use of territory restrictions by a car manufacturer against its retail outlets); Dr. Miles, 220
U.S. 373 (dealing with the use of vertical minimum price restraints by a manufacturer
against independent retailers).
72.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
73.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940). The Court
in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. described the full scope of price fixing, noting
that prices are fixed "if the prices paid or charged are to be at a certain level or on ascending
or descending scales, if they are to be uniform, or if by various formulae they are related to
the market price," and they are agreed upon. Id Thus, the key concept is that there must be
an agreement to fix prices and some action must be taken that expressly or indirectly controls the market price. See id.
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Since 1911, such agreements have been held to be per se illegal, 74 the rationale being that any agreement to fix prices, by its very nature, works to
eliminate competition and control the market by forcing consumers to pay
arbitrary and unreasonable prices. 75 During the past one hundred years,
however, the Supreme Court has completely retreated from its view that
resale price maintenance should be per se illegal by systematically eroding
its bans on each and every type of vertical restraint,76 the final blow being
provided by the Court in Leegin.77 The following discussion will highlight
pivotal Supreme Court cases dealing with vertical restraints in order to shed
light on the reasoning underlying the Court's recent shift away from per se
rules of illegality in the area. As will become evident, the cause of the
Court's shift stems largely from two key factors: a lack of consensus as to
effects of vertical restraints and conflicting policy goals of the
the economic 78
Act.
Sherman
The per se rule of illegality for vertical price restraints was first declared by the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
80
Sons Co. 79 In Dr. Miles, the complainant, a manufacturer of medicines,
sought to control retail prices by requiring that its retail agents contractually
agree to sell its goods at a fixed price. 81 Dr. Miles argued that the reason for
the policy was to protect the company's goodwill and to ensure the realization of a fair profit on its manufactured goods.82 The Dr. Miles majority
first noted that the agreement at issue eliminated all competition among
wholesalers and retailers and, in effect, fixed the prices consumers would
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408-09 (1911).
74.
See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927);
75.
Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1314, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480)
(stating that the very function of resale price maintenance is to raise the price paid by consumers and that resale price maintenance has such an effect is not in dispute).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725 (overturning the per se rule against vertical minimum
76.
price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18-19, 22 (1997) (striking down the
per se rule against vertical maximum resale price maintenance); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51
n. 18, 59 (overruling the per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2725 (overturning the per se rule against vertical minimum
77.
price maintenance).
See discussion infra Part II.B.
78.
220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
79.
Id.at 374.
80.
81.
Id.at 375-81.
82.
Id. at 375. Dr. Miles Medical Company argued that department stores and other
discount retailers had created a "cut-rate" system which hurt the company's reputation and
profitability. Id. The discount retailers would sell the medicines at prices far below what
smaller retailers could manage. Id. This injured Dr. Miles as smaller retailers would stop
carrying their medicines, reducing the overall sales volume and profitability of the company.
Id. Dr. Miles also argued that the advertisement of its goods at discounted rates made them
appear inferior to the public. Id.
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ultimately pay. 83 However, Dr. Miles argued that such a restraint was lawful as "a manufacturer is entitled to control the prices on all sales of his own
products." 84 In rejecting this contention and holding vertical price fixing to
be per se illegal, the Court relied on two distinct premises.85
First, the Court argued that the right of alienation is an essential right
implicit in the ownership of property.8 Just because a manufacturer makes
a product, does not mean that he may affix conditions as to the use or disposition of the item by a purchaser who obtains full title without offending
public policy. 87 Second, the majority recognized that contracts in restraint
of trade are illegal if the restraint is unreasonable under the particular circumstances involved in the case at bar.88 Finally, the Court found the
agreements created by Dr. Miles to be per se illegal by analogizing them to
horizontal price fixing agreements. 89 The majority argued that such agreements are void, as their sole purpose is to fix prices and harm competition,
thus any restraint fixing prices must ultimately have the same effect on
competition and should be held unlawful. 90
The scope of the Dr. Miles decision was first tested six years later in
UnitedStates v. Colgate & Co. 9' The United States alleged that Colgate had
engaged in a system of resale price fixing by compelling adherence to set
83.
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 399. The Court stated that the fact that the agreements at
issue in Dr. Miles restrained trade "is obvious." Id.at 400. The means by which competition was restrained was set forth in detail:
[E]ach such retailer can obtain his supply only by signing one of the uniform contracts prepared for retailers, whereby he covenants not to sell to
anyone who proposes to sell again unless the buyer is authorized in writing by [Dr. Miles], and not to sell at less than a standard price named in
the agreement. Thus all room for competition between retailers, who
supply the public, is made impossible.
Id. (emphasis added).
84.
Id. at 400.
85.
Id.at 408.
86.
Id.at 404.
87.
See id, at 404-05 (stating that if a party has no possibility of reverter, he has no
right to restrict how the property may be used or disposed of). The notion that an agency
relationship may allow the principal to set the price charged by his agent was reaffirmed
fifteen years later in UnitedStates v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 484-85,487-88 (1926).
88.
See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 406-07. The Court stated that to be reasonable, a
restraint must be fair both in reference to the interests of the parties concerned, and fair in
reference to the public welfare. Id at 407. The primary emphasis must always remain on the
public welfare and the interests of the parties should not be considered unless the public
interest is not implicated by the restraint in question. See id.at 406.
89.
Id.at 408. Horizontal price fixing occurs when "competing companies.., agree
on the price at which the companies will sell their products or services [in the market]."
THOMAS V. VAKERICS, ANTITRUST BASIcs § 4.02 (2006). Horizontal price fixing is illegal
per se. Id
90.
Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408.

91.

250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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retail prices by threatening that no further sales of goods would be made to
any reseller who failed to follow its established prices. 92 The Court held that
a manufacturer may decline to make further sales to a retailer who fails to
adhere to a retail price set by the manufacturer; 93 the rationale being that
without an agreement to fx prices, the Sherman Act is not offended. 94 The
Court cited Dr. Miles and distinguished it on the grounds that Dr. Miles
Company had sought to prevent its retailers from freely exercising their
right to sell via a contractualagreement.95 Thus, the fact that Colgate had
not made any specific agreement requiring
96 its retailers bind themselves to
set prices was dispositive to the majority.
White Motor Company v. United States involved a challenge to the per97
se rule against vertical restraints as applied to nonprice vertical restraints.
The Court rejected the use of a per se rule of illegality in analyzing exclusive territory restraints," citing that per se rules are only appropriate once it
has been shown that the restraint has a "pernicious effect on competition
and lack[s] any redeeming virtue." 99 Thus, as the economic effects of such
nonprice restraints were not obvious to the Court, a per se rule was inap-

92.
Id. at 303.
93.
See id at 305.
94.
See id. at 307.
95.
Id. at 307-08. The Colgate doctrine drawn from this case, which allows manufacturers to decline to make further sales to a discounting retailer so long as the parties do
not make an actual agreement to fix prices, has been recognized as difficult and risky for
manufacturers to apply and thus of limited commercial use. Brief of PING, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-15, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127
S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480); BoRK, supra note 12, at 280-81.
Colgate, 250 U.S. at 305. The Court emphasized that retailers were not contrac96.
tually limited in disposition, explaining that:
The retailer, after buying, could, if he chose, give away his purchase, or
sell it at any price he saw fit, or not sell it at all; his course in these respects being affected only by the fact that he might by his action incur
the displeasure of the manufacturer, who could refuse to make further
sales to him, as he had the undoubted right to do.
Id.at 305-06. The Sherman Act is designed to preserve free trade by prohibiting contracts
that interfere with competition; however, the Act cannot be viewed as restricting the right of
a trader to decide with whom he will deal, or the right to announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to deal. Id.at 305-07 (noting that a trader who carries on
a private business is free to sell to whoever he pleases--this includes the "unquestioned
right" to stop dealing with any party that the trader thinks is acting unfairly or otherwise
trying to undermine his business (citations omitted)).
97.
372 U.S. 253, 255 (1963). White Motor was accused of violating the Sherman
Act by granting exclusive territories to its dealers and restricting the classes of persons to
whom a dealer could sell. Id at 255-57.
98.
Id.at 263.
99.
Id.(quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
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propriate.10° Further, the Court declined to apply a per se rule of illegality
by analogizing the vertical restraint to a horizontal restraint (as was done in
Dr. Miles), recognizing that in many cases, the effects of such restraints are
not the same. 101 Thus, White Motor evidenced the Court's hesitation both to
impose per se rules, and to judge a business practice by analogy.' 02
Seven years later, the Court again visited the subject of vertical territorial restrictions, returning them to a per se rule of illegality in United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 103 In applying the per se rule, the Court ignored
the reasoning in White Motor, giving no real consideration to the economic
effects of vertical territory restrictions, 1 4 and instead, citing Dr. Miles,
placed dispositive weight on principles of alienation and title.105 The Court
distinguished White Motor, suggesting that the rule of reason as applied to
vertical restraints was appropriate in that case as the vertical restraints were
used to assist a new or failing frm. 106 The dissent chastised the majority for
ignoring White Motor and suggested that protecting small businesses and
100.
Id. (explaining that without knowing the actual impact of these arrangements, it
cannot be held that they have "such a pernicious effect on competition and lack any redeeming virtue" so as to be held per se illegal (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5)).
101.
Id. The Court cited that the economic effects of the practice should be judged
under the rule of reason as provided in Chicago Board of Trade quoted in note 35, supra.
White Motor, 372 U.S. at 263.
102.
See id. It is also important to note Justice White's dissent in this case, specifically, his comment on resale price maintenance. Justice White noted: "Resale price maintenance is not only designed to, but almost invariably does in fact, reduce price competition
not only among sellers of the affected product, but quite as much between that product and
competing brands." Id. at 268 (White, J., dissenting). This quote and the comments by the
majority about resale price maintenance, though not at issue in this case, evidences some of
the early divided views within the Court on the subject of vertical minimum resale price
maintenance. See id at 260 (majority opinion), 268 (White, J., dissenting).
103.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967). The next
year, the Court re-affirmed Dr. Miles and the use of a per se rule against vertical price fixing
in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968), relying largely on a retailer's right
to alienation and a concern for intrabrand competition.
104.
Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 374-78. The Court relied more on formalistic line drawing
by distinguishing White Motor, considering Schwinn's purpose for the program, relying on
title and alienation theories, and completely failing to consider the economic effects of the
Schwinn program. Id. See also supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
105.
Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 377-79. "If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his
product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over its destiny or the
conditions of resale." Id at 379. Additionally, the Court made clear that this per se proscription was limited to situations where a manufacturer sells its product to another, as to go
beyond that would subject economically beneficial franchise and distribution systems to per
se illegality. Id. at 380. When the seller is an agent or consignee of the manufacturer, the
manufacturer may impose vertical restraints so long as they do not "unreasonably" restrict
trade under the rule of reason. Id. at 380-81.
106.
Id. at 374. This suggested that an otherwise unreasonable restraint may be saved
if protecting a new or failing firm. See id.
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intramarket competition should be considerations of the Court in shaping
antitrust policy. 107
In Continental T. ,Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,108 the Court overruled
its decision in Schwinn and sounded the Court's first major retreat from Dr.
Miles by holding that all nonprice vertical restraints should be analyzed
under the rule of reason.'0 9 The Court began by recognizing Schwinn 's error, both in failing to consider the competitive effects of the applicable vertical restraints and in ignoring White Motor's instruction that per se rules
are only appropriate when the effects of a practice have been shown to have
' 10
a "pernicious effect on competition and lack ...any redeeming virtue."
In judging the effects of nonprice vertical restraints, the majority first rejected the notion that alienation and the transfer of title should be considered in judging the applicability of per se rules."' The Court went on to
consider the economic effects of vertical nonprice restraints, considering
both the interbrand and intrabrand effects of such restraints," 2 but ultimately seemed to give more credence to the efficiency benefits vertical
restraints could offer interbrand competition." 3 Interestingly, the majority
seemed to agree with Schwinn insofar as protecting small business was a
107.
Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 385-88 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The goal of protecting small business was later criticized by economic theorists as
inefficient. "Antitrust objectives and the objectives of small businesspeople are incompatible
at a very fundamental level. The only kind of antitrust policy that would benefit small business would be one that sought to prevent large firms from underpricing less efficient small
firms by sharing their lower costs with consumers in the form of lower prices." POSNER,
supra note 21, at 26.
108.
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
109.
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.18, 57-59 (1977).
The majority also reaffirmed the per se rule against vertical minimum price fixing and the
fact that Congress had supported this view by repealing the Fair Trade Laws, a view that was
later denied by the Leegin majority. Id.at 52 n. 18. See also Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2724 (2007).
110.
Id. at 49-51 (citing White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); N.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
111.
Id. at 52-54, 54 nn.20-21. The Court argued that considering the rule of alienation in antitrust analysis had long been criticized by commentators as "both a misreading of
legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis." Id. The Court criticized reliance on the
transfer of title and agency relationships as inaccurate as there had been no showing that
such a relationship had any actual effect on competition. Id.at 52-54.
112.
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-57. Intrabrand competition is defined as "competition
between the distributors - wholesale or retail - of the product of a particular manufacturer."
Id.at 52 n. 19. In contrast, interbrand competition is defined as "competition among manufacturers of the same generic product." Id
113.
Id.at 52-54; BORK, supra note 12, at 287. The Court also recognized the "freerider" effect for the first time and argued it may be controlled with vertical restraints. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55. "Free-riding" occurs when "discounting retailers ... free ride on retailers who furnish services [by] captur[ing] some of the increased demand those services generate" without providing the services themselves. Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2715.
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concern of the Court, though, they ultimately argued that small businesses
may actually be harmedby per se rules against vertical restraints.11 4 Thus,
in the end, the majority simply could not justify a finding that vertical nonprice restraints should be subject to a per se rule of illegality.1 5
Following Sylvania, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.11 6 and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. were decided by the
Court.11 7 Both cases significantly impacted contemporary vertical restraint
analysis, though neither altered the use of the per se rule for vertical price
restraints or the rule of reason for vertical nonprice restraints. Monsanto,
while largely dealing with the scope of the Colgate rule,118 seemed to inch
the Court closer to overturning the per se rule against vertical price fixing
by noting that the economic effects of both vertical price and vertical nonprice restraints are, "in many, but not all, cases similar or identical." '" 9
Such a finding largely undermined the use of different tests for vertical
price and vertical nonprice restraints. Business Electronics moved the Court
even closer to striking down the per se rule against vertical price fixing by
stating that, "interbrand competition is the primary concern of the antitrust
laws. 1 20 As vertical price restraints have the largest negative impact on
intrabrand competition, 121 this rationale would allow the Court to overlook
22
many of the "anticompetitive" effects of vertical price restraints. 1
The final major blow to the per se rule against vertical restraints prior
to the Leegin decision came in State Oil Co. v. Khan,' 23 where the Court
held that vertical maximum price fixing was no longer to be subject to a rule
of per se illegality. 24 The case overruled Albrecht v. HeraldCo., which had
held vertical maximum price fixing was per se illegal by largely equating

114.
115.

116.
117.

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56-57, 57 n.26.
Id at 57-59.

485 U.S. 717 (1988).
465 U.S. 752 (1984).

118.
See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of Colgate.
119.
Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762. The majority stated in a footnote that amici in the
case had argued that the economic effects of vertical price and nonprice restraints are a "little different," and while the majority noted that such a question was not at issue in the case,
it nevertheless noted in the opinion the similar effects of both restraints. Id. at 761 n.7, 762.
120.
Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726. The majority argued that intrabrand competition
need not be protected because interbrand competition would achieve the same beneficial
ends. Id. at 725. Further, it was argued that intrabrand competition may actually be bad for
small businesses as it may provide manufacturers with an incentive to vertically integrate
into the retail sphere. Id. This decision again shows the Court's consistent concern with the
impact of antitrust doctrine on small businesses.
121.
See infra Part V.B. 1.
122.
See infra Part IV.B.1.
123.
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
124.
Id. at 22.
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vertical minimum price fixing with vertical maximum price fixing. 125 In
striking down that precedent, the Khan Court principally relied on the rationale that antitrust law is primarily concerned with interbrand competition, and that low prices benefit consumers and are "the very essence of
competition."'' 26 Thus, the Court was quick to recognize the most obvious
use of vertical maximum price fixing was beneficial to consumers: keeping
retail prices low and competitive.127 It is also worth noting that in undermining one of the justifications for a per se rule, that manufacturers may set
retail prices too low, the Court for the first time seemed to imply that the
interests of manufacturers and consumers were actually in line with each
other. 28 This rationale would later be used to argue that all vertical restraints (which are set by manufacturers) are not likely to be anticompetitive as manufacturers and consumers have the same market goals.' 29 Thus,
the stage was set for the Court's final blow to the per se rule of illegality
against vertical restraints-a retreat
from the century old per se rule against
30
vertical minimum price fixing.'
III.

FACTS: LEEGIN CREATIVE LEATHER PRODUCTS,INC. V. PSKS, INC.

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Leegin Creative Leather Products is a small, family-owned, women's
fashion accessory company, which manufactures, distributes, and sells
leather goods and accessories. 131In 1991, Leegin began operating under the
brand name "Brighton," which now sells a variety of fashion accessories in
over 5000 retail stores across the United States. 32 Brighton's retail strategy
125.
126.
127.

390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968).
Khan, 522 U.S. at 15.
Id.at 15-16.

128.
See id at 17.
129.
See infra Parts IV.A-B. 1.
130.
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
131.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2710
(2007); Brief for Petitioner at 2, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
132.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2710. Brighton sells, among other things, small leather
goods, watches, fragrances, jewelry, home accessories, eyewear, and luggage. Brighton
History, http://www.brighton.com/retail/aboutus/history (last visited Oct. 22, 2007).
Leegin primarily sells to independent retail stores; however, Leegin also owns (or co-owns)
and operates approximately seventy retail stores in which its own products are exclusively
sold. Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2710; Brief of Respondent at 2-3, Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480). PSKS, Inc. attempted to
argue that the ownership of such outlets by Leegin created a horizontal price fixing scheme.
Brief of Respondent at 2-3, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct.
2705 (2007) (No. 06-480). That argument was ignored by the Leegin majority. Leegin, 127
S. Ct. at 2710-25.
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is based on product differentiation; by offering its goods at small independently owned boutiques, Brighton is able to provide a level of service and
personal attention to each customer which is unavailable at large discount
and department stores. 133

PSKS, Inc., does business as Kay's Kloset and operates a single
women's apparel store in Lewisville, Texas. 134 Kay's Koset sells products
from over seventy-five manufacturers, and at one time sold the Brighton
line. 3 1 In 1995, Kay's Kloset began purchasing products and accessories
from Brighton. 136 To promote the new line, PSKS invested heavily in advertising and held "Brighton days" in its store. 37 Kay's Kloset became the
top Brighton retailer in its area, with Brighton product sales accounting for
nearly half of its annual profits. 138
In 1997, Brighton introduced its "Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy," which announced that the company would no longer sell to
any retailer that discounted Brighton products below suggested retail
prices. 139 Brighton instituted this policy to promote an "everyday fair price"
retail approach in order to protect the Brighton image and to keep customers who bought "at the wrong moment" from feeling cheated when items
went on sale. 140 Additionally, Brighton adopted the policy to give retailers
incentives to provide extra attention and care to the Brighton line. 141 It reasoned that in order to encourage retailers to provide such service, it would
42
need to ensure that retailers were rewarded with sufficient profit margins. 1
In 1998, Brighton introduced another marketing strategy called the
"Heart Store Program."' 43 Heart Stores were provided special incentives for
promoting the Brighton brand in a special section of their store and promising to "follow the Brighton Suggested Pricing Policy at all times."' 44 Kay's
133.
Brief for Petitioner at 2-3, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
134.

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.

136.

PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 Fed. App'x 464, 465

135.

Id.

(5th Cir. 2006).
137.

Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711.

138. Id.
139. Id. The policy did contain an exception that allowed retailers to discount products the retailer did not intend to reorder from Brighton. Id.
140. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127
S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480). Brighton believed that sales "degrade[] a manufacturer's
brand," and thus adopted its pricing policy to avoid them altogether. Id

141.

Id.

143.

Id.

142.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2711. Avoiding discounts was a way to ensure that profit
margins for participating retailers were protected. Id.
144.

PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 Fed. App'x 464, 465

(5th Cir. 2006).
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Kloset became a Heart Store; however, Leegin revoked Kay's Kloset's
status as a Heart Store later that year,
though it allowed the company to
4
continue selling Brighton products. 1
In 2002, Leegin discovered that Kay's Kloset had been discounting its
entire Brighton line by twenty percent. 46 Leegin confronted Kay's Kloset
about the discounts and was told that Kay's was discounting Brighton
products in order to compete with another nearby Brighton dealer who was
also selling Brighton products below suggested prices. 147 Leegin requested
that Kay's discontinue its discounting of Brighton products, and when
Kay's Kloset refused, Leegin halted all sales to the retailer. 4a The loss of
Brighton was a significant blow to Kay's49Kloset, whose profits and sales
declined sharply from the loss of the line. 1
B.

DISTRICT COURT DECISION

PSKS sued Leegin in Federal Court, alleging that Leegin violated the
Sherman Act by "entering into agreements with retailers to charge only
those prices fixed by Leegin."' 150 The jury found for PSKS on the grounds
that Leegin had agreed to fix retail prices of Brighton products and that
PSKS suffered an injury as a result of said price fixing. Following this
ruling, Leegin made a motion52for a new trial and renewed a prior motion for
judgment as a matter of law. 1
In the motion, Leegin's primary argument was that the court erred
when it refused to admit the testimony of Leegin's economic expert at trial
who would have testified that Leegin's price fixing scheme was not anticompetitive.153 The court rejected Leegin's motion on the grounds that excluding the expert's testimony was correct as a matter of law. 1 4 The court
cited Dr. Miles in holding that vertical minimum price fixing is illegal per
se under the Sherman Act. 155Admitting Leegin's economic expert was thus
not in error, because to allow such testimony would be to sanction an indi145.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2711.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.at 2712.
151.
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 Fed. App'x 464, 466
(5th Cir. 2006).
152.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., No. Civ.A. 2:03-CV-107,
2004 WL 5254322, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2004).
153.
Id.Leegin also appealed on the grounds that the damage model used to calculate
PSKS's damages was "impermissibly speculative." Id.This issue is of no concern to the
arguments set forth in this note.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
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rect challenge to the per se status of vertical minimum price restraints and
"[w]hether the per se classification of such agreements is wise [was] not for
[the district] court to decide."' 15 6 Additionally, the court rejected the contention by Leegin that the court
could find an exception to the per se rule under
157
bar.
at
case
the
of
facts
the
C.

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Leegin appealed the decision of the district court to apply a per se rule
of illegality to its pricing policy, but did not deny that it entered into price
fixing agreements with retailers. 58 Leegin made three arguments as to why
the rule of reason, as opposed to a per se rule, should be applied in its
the three claims made by Leegin
case. 159 The circuit court rejected each of
1 60
in upholding the district court's decision.
First, Leegin argued that the Supreme Court has applied the per se rule
The court
of illegality inconsistently in the area of vertical price fixing. 161
rejected that argument citing that in the area of vertical minimum resale
price maintenance, the Supreme Court had consistently applied the per se
rule of illegality established by Dr. Miles. 62 Second, Leegin argued that its
pricing policy benefited competition, and therefore should be given an exception to the per se rule. 163 The court again rejected this contention on the
156.
Id.
157.
Leegin, 2004 WL 5254322, at *1. Leegin relied on United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that a business practice that is a per
se violation of the Sherman Act must still be analyzed to discern whether it is "plainly anticompetitive," and thus falling within the reach of per se illegality), in making its argument
for an exception to the per se rule under the circumstances. Leegin, 2004 WL 5254322, at
*1.
158.
PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 171 Fed. App'x 464, 466
(5th Cir. 2006).
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
Id. Leegin cited State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (rejecting the applica161.
bility of the per se rule to vertical maximum price fixing), Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (applying the rule of reason to vertical agreements which in effect raised retail prices, though no particular price was specified by agreement), and Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (adopting the
rule of reason for vertical nonprice restraints) in making its argument, none of which dealt
with vertical minimum resale price maintenance. Leegin, 171 Fed. App'x at 466.
162.
Id.at 466-67.
163.
Id. at 467. Leegin cited Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystems, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that a "blanket license" that literally created a price
fixing arrangement was not per se illegal as it was the license and pricing policy that created
the competitive market for the goods and thus offered a competitive benefit to both consumers and producers), Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that an agreement to divide the market was not per se illegal because it was a vertical nonprice restraint as opposed to a horizontal one), and United States v. Realty Multi-List,
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grounds that no such exception has ever been recognized by the Supreme
Court in the area of vertical minimum price fixing.'64 Finally, Leegin challenged the exclusion of its economic expert, arguing that the expert would
have opined as to the procompetitive benefits of Leegin's pricing policy,
justifying the applicability of the rule of reason. 165 The court again affirmed
the district court, holding that the testimony of an economic expert is irrelevant when a competitive practice is held to be per se illegal.' 66 In such
cases, the necessity of any economic analysis is avoided
by the presumption
67
of unreasonableness established by a per se rule.1
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS: LEEGIN CREATIVE LEATHER PRODUCTS, INC. v. PSKS, INC.
DECISION AND RATIONALE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN LEEGIN

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Leegin, framing
the question presented as "whether the Court should overrule the per se rule
and allow resale price maintenance agreements to be judged by the rule of
reason."' 168 In so framing the issue, the Court took direct aim at the wisdom

and precedential value of Dr. Miles, 69 which had sustained the per se illegality of vertical minimum price restraints for almost a century. 170 In a 5-4
decision,' 71 the majority overruled Dr. Miles, 72 and held that vertical price
restraints were no longer subject to per
se illegality, but should instead be
73
analyzed under the "rule of reason." 1
The Court first attacked Dr. Miles, arguing the case had been based
not on the actual economic effects of vertical minimum price maintenance,
but instead upon formalistic line drawing. 74 It criticized the Dr. Miles

Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980) (arguing that each alleged per se violation must be examined under Broadcast Music, to judge whether the violation is "plainly anticompetitive," and
thus truly falling within the scope of per se illegality) in shaping this challenge.
164.
Leegin, 171 Fed. App'x at 467. The court also noted that subsequent to the
cases recognizing exceptions had been decided, the Supreme Court had reaffirmed the per se
rule's applicability in the area of vertical minimum price fixing. Id
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
See id.(quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
168.
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2710
(2007).
169.
See supra notes 79-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dr. Miles.
170. Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2710.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.at 2714.
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Court for relying on the ancient common law, 175 for relying on the concept
of alienation, 176 and for analogizing vertical restraints to horizontal restraints. 177 Thus, the Court argued that Dr. Miles never justified the imposition of a per se rule of illegality for vertical price restraints in the first place,
and so the question of whether or not a per se rule should be applied to vertical minimum price restraints was, to some extent, examined in Leegin for
the first time. 178
The majority based the crux of its opinion on the rationale that contemporary economic analysis has shown that vertical minimum price restraints may have many procompetitive implications. 179 The Court argued
that modem economic study has shown not only that vertical minimum
price maintenance may be procompetitive, but also that such practices are
unlikely to be harmful to competition in a number of markets.180 Specifically, vertical minimum price restraints benefit the market by reducing in8
trabrand competition and, as a result, stimulate interbrand competition.' 1
Protecting interbrand
competition has been cited as "the primary purpose of
' 82
the antitrust laws."'
175.
Id. (explaining that the state of the common law in years past is wholly irrelevant in evaluating the economic impact a certain practice has on today's American economy).
176.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2714 (arguing that concerns about restrictions on alienation
applied not to chattels, but to land and the need of society to ensure that real property was
not kept out of the stream of commerce, and so is irrelevant here).
177.
Id. In support of this contention, the Court cited Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988), and Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982), which both recognized a fundamental difference
between horizontal and vertical restraints. Id.
178.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2714.
179.
Id. at 2710. Per se rules are only appropriate when a given restraint "would
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output," and when courts
can predict with confidence that such a practice would be struck down under the rule of
reason in almost all cases. Id.at 2713 (quoting Business Electronics,485 U.S. at 723). Per se
rules must be based on actual economic effects and not "formalistic line drawing;" thus, if
the economic effects of a business practice are not immediately obvious, the rule of reason
should apply. Id. (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59
(1977)).
180.
Id.at 2714-15. The Court also stated that even critics of vertical minimum resale price maintenance have recognized that the practice may have procompetitive justifications. Id. at 2715.
181.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2714-15. See supra note 112 for the definitions of interbrand and intrabrand competition. Interestingly, the Court proffered this contention by
analogizing vertical price restraints to vertical nonprice restraints in much the same fashion
as the Dr. Miles Court analogized horizontal and vertical price fixing. Compare Leegin, 127
S. Ct. at 2715, with Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408
(1911).
182.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2715 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15
(1997)).
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The Court reasoned that the elimination of intrabrand competition was
beneficial to the market on the grounds that curbing intrabrand competition
encourages retailers to invest in services and promotional efforts. 8 Such
promotions and services may increase competition among rival manufacturers and also provide customers with the opportunity to choose between
"low-price, low-service brands [and] high-price, high-service brands."' 184
Allowing manufacturers to fix minimum prices helps ensure that retailers
providing such services are able to reap the benefit of the increased demand
the services create and do not lose sales to discounting retailers who refuse
to offer such services.18 5 Thus, the manufacturer is supposedly benefited as86
retailers compete over services that consumers prefer, and not over price. 1
Additionally, the Court argued that manufacturers may use resale price
maintenance to protect new firms and brands, 187 to encourage "retailers to
stock adequate inventories in the face of uncertain demand, ' ' 88 and as a
more efficient mechanism to encourage retailers to provide value-added
services.' 89
The Court next recognized that vertical minimum price maintenance
may also have anticompetitive effects. 190 First, any price fixing arrangement
may be designed solely to obtain illegal monopoly profits and vertical resale price maintenance may be used to mask such a scheme. 19' Second, vertical price restraints may be used to organize cartels at both the retail and
183.
Id.
184.
Id.
185.
Id. This condition is known as the "free-rider effect." See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (finding that although all retailers may benefit
if each provided the additional services requested by the manufacturer, in a competitive
market, some retailers may choose not to provide them); BORK, supra note 12, at 290 ("Customers will be able to go to the retailer who offers a display of the full line, explanation of
the product, and so forth, and then purchase from the retailer who offers none of these things
but gives a lower price. The result will be a diminution in the amount of sales and service
effort by all retailers. When this is to the manufacturers disadvantage, he may wish to employ ... resale price maintenance.").
186.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2716.
187.
Id. ("[Resale price maintenance can be used] in order to induce competent and
aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required
in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer." (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at
55)). Recall that this justification for an exception for the per se rule against vertical nonprice restraints was offered in Schwinn. See supranote 106 and accompanying text.
188.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2716 (citing Deneckere, Marvel, & Peck, Demand Uncertainty, Inventories,andResale PriceMaintenance, Ill Q. J. ECON. 885, 911 (1996)).
189.
Id. The Court argued that using resale price maintenance and threatening termination of the business relationship may be a more efficient means of encouraging retailers to
provide extra services as opposed to requiring that a manufacturer contract with each and
every retailer as to what services the retailer must perform. Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id.
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manufacturer level, both of which are horizontal restraints and per se illegal. 192 Finally, vertical price maintenance may be used by powerful retailers
to "forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs" or by powerful
manufacturers to provide retailers an incentive not to sell a rival's products. 193 Based on the above economic factors, the Court concluded that ver-

tical minimum price maintenance does not "always or almost always tend[]
to restrict competition and decrease output,"' 194 and thus a rule of per se
illegality is not appropriate. 195
The majority next went on to reject the main contentions set forth by
the Respondent as to why Dr. Miles should be upheld. First, the Court argued that the administrative convenience of per se rules is not an adequate
reason for their continued adherence. 196 Second, the mere fact that vertical
minimum price maintenance may lead to higher prices is not alone sufficient grounds to find the practice to be anticompetitive.1 97 Arguably, many
decisions made by a manufacturer raise the ultimate prices of its goods and
do not violate the Sherman Act-if done 9for
the same reason, neither
8
1
maintenance.
price
minimum
vertical
should
The Court concluded that the rule of reason and the market itself can
adequately protect consumers from anticompetitive uses of vertical minimum price maintenance. 199 Vertical price restraints instituted by a manufacturer are unlikely to be used to reap monopolistic retail profit margins since
the interests of manufacturers and consumers in regards to retail profit margins are generally in line with each other. 200 Additionally, vertical minimum
192.
Id. at 2716-17. "A cartel is an association by agreement of companies or sections of companies having common interests, designed to prevent extreme or unfair competition and to allocate markets, and perhaps also to exchange scientific or technical knowledge
or patent rights and to standardize products, with competition regulated but not eliminated
by substituting competition in quality, efficiency, and service for price-cutting." 54 AM. JUR.
2D Monopolies andRestraints of Trade § 20 (2007).
193.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717.
194.
Id. (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
.195.
Id. at 2718.
196.
Id. (explaining that such reasoning would imply that per se rules are the norm
rather than the exception). While per se rules may decrease administrative costs, they may
also increase the total cost of production to society by prohibiting procompetitive conduct.

Id.

197.
Id.(arguing that it is error to rely on pricing effects alone without a further
showing that such pricing policies are anticompetitive).
198.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2719 (explaining that, inter alia, purchasing higher quality
inputs and advertising increases the ultimate cost to consumers but are perfectly legal practices as they are designed to increaseconsumer demand).
199.
Id.
200.
Id.at 2718. The Court argued that retail profit margins are part of the manufac-

turer's cost of distribution, which manufacturers desire to minimize in order to maximize the

total volume of products it may sell. See id at 2718-19. Additionally, if the price of a good is
too high, consumers will substitute a rival good, further depressing the quantity of goods
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price maintenance only poses a real threat to consumers when a large number of rival manufacturers adopt the practice. 20 1 Finally, vertical minimum
price fixing can be abused by a manufacturer or retailer if and when they
possess significant market power, making anticompetitive price fixing
schemes less likely to occur and easier to police.20 2
Finally, the Court held that stare decisis did not alone require continued adherence to Dr. Miles' rule of per se illegality for vertical minimum
price maintenance.20 3 The majority recognized that while stare decisis concerns are highest in the area of statutory interpretation, its considerations
are not as important in the case of the Sherman Act, which has long been
treated as a common law statute. 204 Thus, rather than engage in a replete
stare decisis analysis, the Court simply concluded that the rational underpinnings of Dr. Miles had been eroded and that the decision was inconsistent with contemporary antitrust jurisprudence in the area of vertical restraints. 20 5 The Court feared that if Dr. Miles was not overruled, other cases
that have recently struck down per se rules banning other types of vertical
restraints would come under attack.20 6 Finally, the majority argued that
since Congress had not taken direct action to ratify the Dr. Miles rule, the

sold by a manufacturer. Id. Conversely, at least through the Court's eyes, retailers only want
to maximize per unit profit margins as opposed to the total quantity of goods sold. Id Thus,
manufacturers have an incentive to protect consumers from monopolistic profit margins and
not to overcompensate retailers that may justify vertical minimum price maintenance. Id.
201.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719 (explaining that if only a small number of rival manufacturers imposed vertical price restraints to take advantage of monopolistic profits, interbrand competition would divert consumers to lower-cost substitutes).
202.
See id.at 2720.
203.
Id. ("[SItare decisis reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." (quoting
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997))).
204.
Id. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text discussing the common law
nature of the Sherman Act.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2721-22. The Court argued that economic analysis has
205.
shown the procompetitive impact vertical minimum price fixing may have on the market.
Id. at 2720. Additionally, the majority noted that recent decisions have continually tempered
the use of per se rules in the area of vertical restraints. Id.
206.
Id. at 2722. The Court specifically argued that United States v. Colgate & Co.,
250 U.S. 300 (1919) (allowing manufacturers to set suggested retail prices and to refuse to
deal with retailers who ignore them), and Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (imposing the rule of reason to judge vertical nonprice restraints), would be
called into question. The Court argued that these cases allow manufacturers to take advantage of vertical price restraints, though they are less efficient than adopting an express vertical price restraint. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2722. Specifically, the majority justified the comparison between Dr. Miles and other vertical price maintenance cases (most notably Colgate) by arguing that the economic effects of vertical restraints were the same. Id
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deference to which the Court must usually afford congressional action was
not present.2 °7
Four Justices dissented, questioning both the economic and administrative underpinnings of the majority's decision and taking particular issue
with its stare decisis analysis. 20 8 The dissent argued that the fundamental
problem with applying per se rules is weighing the arguments for and
against such rules, which often point in different and conflicting directions.20 9 First, the dissent noted the anticompetitive harms setting minimum
resale prices poses.2 10 Specifically, it cited that if used to induce retailers to
provide intangible services, such practices may wastefully attract too many
resources to an industry and inhibit the development of new and more efficient styles of retailing.21 1 Additionally, vertical minimum price maintenance may provide a legitimate front for tacit collusion among manufacturers. 21 2 Conversely, the dissent noted three oft cited benefits that minimum
resale price maintenance may bring: it may facilitate the entry of new firms
and products into the market, curb "free-riding," and may be used to help
manufacturer's stimulate demand for their products.213
207.
Id. at 2724. In making this argument, the Respondent cited that Congress had
passed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 75-314, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), and the
McGuire Act, Pub. L. 82-542, 66 Stat. 631 (1942), which authorized each State the option of
passing a fair trade law legalizing intrastate vertical price restraints. The Respondent argued
that when Congress repealed these Acts via the Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No.
94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975), it ratified its view that vertical minimum price fixing should be
per se illegal. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2723-24. The Court argued that Congress did not ratify
its view that vertical minimum price fixing should be per se illegal in passing the Consumer
Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975), but rather it ratified its view
that vertical minimum price fixing should not be per se legal. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2724.
208.
Id. at 2725-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209.
Id. at 2726. The dissent cited the three sets of conflicting considerations that
must be weighed in an antitrust case: "(1) potential anticompetitive effects, (2) potential
benefits, and (3) administration [of the law]." Id
210.
Id. at 2727-28.
211. Id.at 2727.
212.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2724 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that
manufacturers could use vertical minimum price maintenance to tacitly collude, "i.e., observe each other's pricing behavior, each understanding that price cutting by one firm is
likely to trigger price competition by all." Id. Vertical minimum resale price maintenance
will make it easier for rival firms to discover when a manufacturer has lowered its retail
prices, triggering price competition. Id. Thus, vertical minimum price fixing agreements,
"tend to prevent price competition from breaking out; and.., will thereby tend to stabilize
producer prices," as manufacturers would rather keep the status quo and retain higher profits. Id.
213.
Id. at 2728. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of
"free-riding" and how vertical price restraints may help the market entry of new firms and
products. The dissent argued that vertical price restraints may be used to stimulate demand
by producers if they have some special reason for wanting to stabilize prices (i.e. curbing
free-riders or facilitating market entry). Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2728 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The dissent argued that the per se rule against vertical minimum price
fixing should prevail, not because of the particular harms vertical minimum
price maintenance may pose, but rather due to administrative concerns as to
whether courts can accurately and consistently police vertical price restraints.214 It argued that "antirust law cannot, and should not, precisely
replicate economists' (sometimes conflicting) views... because law, unlike
economics, is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon
the content of rules and precedent only as they are applied by judges and
juries in courts."21 5 It noted that economists have discovered a number of
harms posed by vertical minimum price maintenance, but then took particular issue with the supposed benefits vertical minimum price restraints may
offer, arguing that economists have failed to show with any certainty that
the benefits offered by vertical price maintenance are needed in the market.216 Analyzing vertical minimum price maintenance under the rule of
reason would invite lengthy trials involving competing experts who would
present highly technical data that judges and juries cannot fairly be expected to understand and apply.2 17 Thus, if judges and juries cannot easily
identify the instances in which the benefits of vertical minimum price maintenance outweigh the harms and if the actual benefits of vertical minimum
price maintenance are 2themselves
unclear, the administrative need for a per
8
se rule should prevail.
Finally, the dissent took issue with the majority's stare decisis analysis, arguing that the Court erred in failing to consider the ordinary criteria
for overturning an earlier case. 2 19 First, it argued that the question of
As producers usually benefit from price competition among their retailers and would only
benefit from vertical price fixing if needed for a special reason, vertical minimum price
maintenance programs instituted by manufacturers carry a presumption of legitimacy. Id.
214. Id. at 2730.
215.
Id.at 2729.
216. Id. at 2729-30. The dissent noted, for example, that economic data has failed to
show that "free-riding" poses a problem to the economy: "the ultimate question is not
whether, but how much, [anticompetitive] free riding... takes place [in the market]." Id. at
2730.
217.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
218.
Id.The dissent did advocate allowing an exception to the per se rule for new
market entrants. Id. at 2731.
219. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652
(2007); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). In PlannedParenthood v.
Casey, the Court applied the following stare decisis analysis: "whether [the case's] central
rule has been found unworkable; whether the rule ... could be removed without serious
inequity to those who have relied upon it or significant damage to the stability of the society
governed by it; whether the law's growth in the intervening years has left [the case's] central
rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society, and whether [the case's] premises of fact
have so far changed in the ensuing two decades as to render its central holding somehow
irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed." 505 U.S. at 855.
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whether or not to overrule Dr. Miles is a question of statutory construction
where principles of stare decisis should apply more "rigidly., 220 Second,
the dissent noted that stare decisis should apply with special weight in the
Leegin case because of the long reliance on the Dr.Miles rule. 221 Third, Dr.
Miles has not made the legal regime "unworkable," but rather has proved
practical and has simplified the complex analysis that would stem from
analyzing vertical minimum price restraints under the rule of reason.2 22
Fourth, Dr. Miles does not "unsettle" the law. 23 Fifth, the dissent argued
that Dr. Miles should not be overruled as its rule involves property and contract rights, where significant public reliance interests are involved.224
Sixth, the Dr. Miles rule has become "embedded in our national culture" as
consumers prefer low prices and creates a bright line rule easily understood
by businesses, consumers, and the judicial system alike and thus should be
upheld. 225 The dissent argued that the only contrary stare decisis factor the
majority points to is that "from the beginning... [the Court] has treated the
Sherman Act as a common law statute., 226 The dissent discredits this claim
by stating that Congress has expressed its approval for a per se rule against
vertical minimum price fixing, 227 and that the common law does not allow
the outright overruling of precedent.22 8
220.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2734 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In the area of statutory construction, stare decisis should weigh heavily as Congress is free to change the Court's interpretation of the law. Id. The dissent wholly disagrees that stare decisis should be any less
important in the area of the Sherman Act merely because the Act is designed to be shaped as
the common law. See id
221.
Id. (noting that Dr. Miles has been deemed good law for almost one-hundred

years).
222. Id. at 2734-35.
223. Id. at 2735. The dissent argued that overruling Dr. Miles is the act that would
unsettle the law. Id,
224. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that
many discount retailers (and internet retailers) have "financed, structured, and operated their
businesses" in reliance on Dr. Miles by investing "time, money, and labor in an effort to
bring ... lower cost goods to Americans." Id. Allowing manufacturers to limit price competition presents a barrier to entry for such "low-price innovators" and threatens their business
model. Id. The dissent also argued that the general public has relied on Dr. Miles and discount retailers by investing in shopping malls where discounters are the anchor store, by
deciding to purchase homes near discount retailers, and by choosing to shop at discount
retailers. Id.
225. Id.
at 2736.
226. Id.
227. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See supra note 207 and
accompanying text (discussing how congressional approval of the per se rule for vertical
minimum price fixing may be discerned).
228. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2736 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
scope and effect of such a rule must be gradually eroded over time until the courts may
finally put it to rest. Id
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WHY THE LEEGINMAJORITY GOT IT ALL WRONG

The Court's UnderlyingEconomic Assumptions are Misguided

Underlying the Court's holding in Leegin was the rationale that per se
rules are only appropriate when a particular competitive practice has been
shown to "always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output. ''229 As per se rules are not appropriate where the economic
impact of a business practice is not immediately obvious, 23 ° the fact that
economic experts largely disagree as to the market impact of a particular
business practice may be sufficient to allow the Court to find that a per se
rule is not appropriate.23 However, to find that a practice "always or almost
always" results in harm to the market, 232 other factors must also be considered, such as to what extent the market may even allow for the beneficial
use of a particular business practice.233 The majority ignored this key point
of analysis, arguing instead that because contemporary economic analysis
has shown some competitive uses for vertical price maintenance, it should
be analyzed under the rule of reason.234 This reasoning misses the point,
since it indicates nothing about whether those procompetitive uses are far
more likely to be the aim of vertical minimum price maintenance schemes
than anticompetitive practices.2 35
The Court's failure to consider how and to what degree vertical minimum price maintenance may be applied in the market shows, among other
things, the majority's error in relying on economic theory as opposed to
229.
Id.at 2717 (majority opinion) (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
230.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
231.
See id
232.
Id.(quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
233.
See, e.g., Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that when
considering whether a practice is anticompetitive it is not solely the possible benefits and
potential harms of the practice which must be weighed, but also how often the market may
give rise to situations allowing for the beneficial use of the practice; if the market will rarely
allow for the beneficial use of a practice, it will "almost always" tend to be anticompetitive
in practice). In dissent, Justice Breyer asked such a question about "free riding," and stated,
"the ultimate question is not whether, but how much, free riding [that may be combated with
vertical price maintenance] takes place. And, after reading the briefs, I must answer that
question with an uncertain 'sometimes."' Id.
234.
Id. at 2714-15.
235.
See id.at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This rationale is evidenced by that fact
that economists have even argued that horizontal price fixing, which is illegal per se and
largely viewed as lacking any socially useful benefits, may have procompetitive uses if the
scheme is adopted ancillary to a procompetitive activity. John Kern, Comment, Price Manipulations in the Commodity Futures Markets: A Reexamination of the Justificationsfor
Simultaneous Causes of Action Under the CEA and the Sherman Act, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1305, 1324-25 (1987).
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empirical data.236 Rather, the Court relied solely on theory drawn from economic models to reach its conclusion in Leegin.237 The problem with relying solely on economic models is that models, as opposed to quantitative
data, base their conclusions on assumptions about the market that may or
may not prove accurate.238 Such market assumptions are often themselves
hotly contested by economists-principle evidenced by the recent shift
within antitrust jurisprudence from analysis under the Harvard School of
economic thought to analysis under the Chicago School. 239 Further, a number of key assumptions underlying the Chicago School, especially those
assumptions having a major impact in the area of vertical price restraints,
have recently come under fire.24 With the factual assumptions upon which
236.
111.Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742-43 (1977) (noting that the "drastic
simplifications" made by economic theory must be abandoned in considering antitrust policy
and that the "sound laws of economics" only add difficulty and uncertainty into antitrust
analysis). See also James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O'Brien & Michael G. Vita, VerticalAntitrustPolicy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005). There is
a severe lack of quantitative data showing the effects of resale price maintenance; however,
two articles were located which analyze such data. See supra note 243 for an overview and
brief critique of their findings. Though not utilized by the majority in Leegin, the use of
empirical data in the area of antitrust law has "increased substantially over the past decade"
through the use of Econometrics, which combines economic theory and the statistical study
of market data to form its conclusions. Gregory J. Werden, A Perspective on the Use of
Econometrics in MergerInvestigationsand Litigation, 16 ANTITRUST 55, 55 (Spring 2002).
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713-20.
237.
Piraino, supra note 47, at 364 (noting that the Chicago School's economic
238.
model is overly simplistic as it assumes the market will always behave perfectly, information
is equally available to all competitors, and that entry is not equally possible for all firms).
See also Jean Wegman Bums, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real World, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 597, 605-07 (1993) (citing the economic assumptions made the Chicago
school as: 1) efficiency is the central concern of consumers, 2) any other consumer concerns
besides efficiency are economically irrelevant, 3) interbrand competition is the key to maintaining low prices and market efficiency, 4) vertical restraints are an economically efficient
way of broadening consumer choice, 5) manufacturer's marketing choices must prevail over
that of the retailer's, 6) any discount retailer is simply a "free-rider," and 7) that the market
will correct any competitive problems and will do so in a more efficient and less intrusive
manner than the courts). Additionally, at a basic level, economic models almost always rely
on the idea that consumers and businesses always act rationally-that business seek to
maximize profits and consumers to maximize their own interests-a theory adopted by
Milton Friedman. Carl T. Bogus, Introduction, ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 1, 3-5 (2000).
A view that may be over-simplistic and is often deemed merely an assumption rather than
economic fact. See id.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text for an overview of the distinctions
239.
between the Harvard and Chicago Schools of economic thought.
Jean Wegman Burns, Challenging the Chicago School on Vertical Restraints,
240.
2006 UTAH L. REv. 913, 916-19 (2006) (explaining that informational dysfunctions, powerful multi-brand retailers, and sunk costs may all impact the market in way that may not be
self-correctable; additionally, it is argued that consumers place a higher importance on intramarket competition, prefer low prices over efficiency, and want businesses to act fair and
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the Chicago School is based called into question, the need for the majority
to have considered some type of quantitative data was exacerbated, but still
ignored.
The problem inherent with relying on economic theory alone may
have been on the majority's mind when it stated, "per se rule[s] [are] appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type
of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that [a
practice] would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of
reason." 241 However, if the majority was to undermine Dr. Miles, and show
its theoretical underpinnings had been eroded, it must have borne the burden of showing that courts cannot predict with confidence that vertical
price restraints would "be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the
rule of reason., 242 The majority failed to rise to this challenge, relying
solely on theory and failing to cite any quantitative study in its entire opinion-studies which have found that vertical price restraints limit intrabrand
competition and harm consumers by raising prices. 3
ethically more so than they want the market to be perfectly efficient). See also Warren S.
Grimes, The Future of Distribution Restraints Law: Will the New Learning Take Hold?,
2006 UTAH L. REv. 885, 886-96 (2006) (citing a number of reasons as to why the Chicago
School is based on false assumptions, but specifically citing the error of ignoring intrabrand
competition); Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand Competition - Stepchild of Antitrust, 36
ANTITRUST BULL. 155 (1991) (arguing that intrabrand competition is important to the market
and beneficial to consumers and that the simplistic way the Chicago School views intrabrand
competition incorrectly discounts the economic benefits of the practice).
241.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (citing Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457
U.S. 332, 344 (1982); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9
(1979)).
242.
See id.
243.
See id. at 2710-25; Burns, supra note 238, at 632-35 (citing data from a number
of consumer organizations tending to show both that vertical minimum price maintenance
results in higher consumer prices and that consumers prefer low prices, thus failing to ban
vertical minimum price fixing leaves consumers worse off in the market); James C. Cooper,
Luke M. Froeb, Dan O'Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of
Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, at Table 1 (2005) (citing a number of studies, five of
which dealt with the effects of vertical minimum resale price fixing). The Cooper, Froeb,
O'Brien & Vita article is of particular interest to the Leegin rationale. While the authors
argued that the studies tended to show the procompetitive effects of vertical minimum price
maintenance, their conclusions are highly suspect based on the data analyzed. James C.
Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O'Brien & Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a
Problem of Inference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, at Table 1 (2005). First, one study found
that after vertical price fixing became harder to enforce, Comingwear's profit margin fell
approximately twelve percent, while the profit margin of its chief competitor rose three
percent. Id. The authors concluded that this proved the procompetitive effects that vertical
minimum price maintenance had on Corningwear; however, no retail figures were considered in the study. Id. This largely questions the authors' conclusions, especially since Corningwear's percentage of profit lost was very different from the net gain in profit its competitor realized. Id This implies that Corningwear was utilizing vertical price fixinng to obtain
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Further, the majority erred by ignoring the impact that vertical minimum price fixing has on intramarket competition. 244 Both the Chicago
School and the Supreme Court rely on the principle that interbrandand not
intrabrandcompetition is the best means to foster market efficiency and
thus should be the focus of antitrust jurisprudence and legal analysis.24 5
This view is based on the theory that retail markets tend to be perfectly
competitive, that they are a "pass-through" market where any change in the
manufacturing market results in an equal change in the retail market. 246
However, this view is in error since it fails to take into account retailing as a
separate and distinct market process and ignores the fact that the manufacturer/retailer relationship is often competitive as opposed to complementary
as assumed by the Chicago School.2 47 Further, the Chicago School inherently assumes that interbrand competition even exists or is relevant in a
given market, an assumption that may be inaccurate in the age of multibrand retailing and marketing segmentation.2 48 In such cases, ignoring inabove-average, or monopolistic profits as its loss after the practice was outlawed was not
offset in the market. See id Another study cited showed that when vertical price maintenance was eliminated from the market, neither manufacturers nor retailers realized any notable change in marginal returns. Id. Finally, one study noted by the authors showed that retail
outlets controlled by the manufacturer had higher retail prices than non-manufacturer controlled, or independent retail outlets, evidencing the fact that vertical minimum price maintenance tends to lead to higher consumer prices. See id.
Pamela Jones Harbour, An Enforcement Perspective on the Work of Robert L.
244.
Steiner: Why Retailing and Vertical Relationships Matter, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 985, 985
(2004) (explaining that neglecting intrabrand competition when analyzing vertical restraints
can result in mistaken applications of antitrust law in consumer markets).
245.
Burns, supra note 238, at 605 (explaining that the Chicago School relies on the
theory that interbrand and not intrabrand competition is the key to low prices and market
efficiency); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988) (noting that
interbrand and not intrabrand competition is the central concern of antitrust jurisprudence).
See also supra note 112 for definitions of interbrand and intrabrand competition.
246.
Harbour, supranote 244, at 987.
Harbour, supra note 244, at 987, 992-94 (citing Robert L. Steiner, The Third
247.
Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 719, 724 (2000)); Grimes, supra note 240, at 887-88.
Retailing creates vertical competition between manufacturers and retailers who are each
vying for the largest share of a product's retail price. Harbour, supra note 244, at 987, 99294 (citing Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST BULL. 719, 724
(2000)). The competitive nature of the manufacturer/retailer relationship is evidenced by the
fact that empirical evidence tends to show that the profit margins of manufacturers and retailers are inversely related. Id If vertical firms had a complimentary relationship, their
profit margins would never be inversely related. Id. The impact of retail sales on the market
is also evidenced by the fact that such sales accounted for over $3.5 trillion worth of the U.S.
economy in 2004. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL BENCHMARK REPORT FOR RETAIL TRADE
AND FOOD SERVICES: JANUARY 1992 THROUGH FEBRUARY 2005, at 8 tbl.4 (March 2005),
availableat http-/www.census.gov/prod/2005pubsbrO4-a.pdf.
Grimes, supra note 240, at 887. Brand selling segments the market and gives
248.
individual firms a higher degree of brand loyalty, or a "power of price" that may allow a
firm to raise prices in order to obtain monopoly profits as the increased brand loyalty will
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249
trabrand competition can retard the innovation of new forms of retailing,
and lead to increased retail prices in contrast to the overwhelming consumer
support of discount retailing. 2 0 Thus, as intrabrand competition may protect
consumers by serving as a check on interbrand competition and have serious procompetitive implications, vertical restraints curbing such competition may be particularly harmful to the market. 251 At the very least, the Chicago School and the courts should acknowledge the benefits of intrabrand
competition and judge market efficiency through a "dual-stage" model that
considers the effects of both interbrand and intrabrand competition.2 52
Those in favor of focusing on interbrand competition often justify the
use of vertical minimum price maintenance by arguing that manufacturers
and consumers both share the desire to have retail distribution achieved at
the lowest possible cost and thus manufacturers will protect consumers'
interests.2 3 This argument has a fundamental flaw in the area of vertical
price restraints.254 Scholars have recognized that manufacturers always seek
to maximize their profits when operating a business. 255 Thus, they will seek
to maximize consumer demand and consumer prices (total revenue = the
number of units sold x price of each unit), as well as to minimize their total

keep customers from substituting other goods and may result in the increased price of all
similar goods as well. See id. at 887-88. In such a case, interbrand competition provides no
check on the market and the only remaining source of market competition that may protect
consumers and correct market prices is intrabrand competition. See id Thus, the question of
how much interbrand competition exists in a given market has profound implications in the
area of antitrust enforcement as the anticompetitive risks present in the market are dictated
largely by which firm along the vertical distribution line has the most market power. Id
249.
Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer:
When are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407 (1997) (explaining how
vertical restraints may be used by manufacturers to the detriment of the market by curbing
the introduction of more efficient forms of retailing).
250.
Bums, supra note 238, at 632-35.
251.
See Harbour, supra note 244, at 991.
252.
See Harbour, supra note 244, at 988.
BORK, supra note 12, at 290. The majority in Leegin agreed with this view. The
253.
Court found that, "[lIn general, the interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned
with respect to retail profit margins." Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127
S. Ct. 2705, 2709 (2007). Low retail prices benefit consumers who want to pay discount
prices and also benefit manufacturers by increasing the consumer demand for their products,
which increases the total quantity of goods sold and thus results in higher profits. See BORK,
supra note 12, at 290.
254.
See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Casefor a PerSe
Rule Against Vertical PriceFixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1491-92 (1983) (noting that relying
on the conclusion that manufacturers are representing consumer interests is an impractical
view of the distribution system, rather, it is likely that in the long run both manufacturers and
retailers will benefit from increased retail prices).
255.
ALFRED W. STONIER & DOUGLAS C. HAGUE, A TEXTBOOK OF ECONOMIC THEORY
316(1961).
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costs (profit = revenue - expenses).2 5 6 Vertical minimum price maintenance
advocates argue that manufacturers will use vertical minimum price maintenance to protect consumers by insuring that retailers keep prices low,
which will keep distribution costs low and keep consumer demand for the
manufacturer's products high.25 7 However, this argument ignores the fact
that in maximizing profits, manufacturers seek both to minimize the cost of
distribution and to maximize the per unitprice charged to consumers.258 By
definition, vertical minimum resale price maintenance allows manufacturers
to achieve such an end. Thus, as manufacturers may have a very real interest in increasing the retail prices of their goods, it would be cavalier to assume that manufacturer and consumer interests are always in line with each
other.
Proponents of the Chicago School argue that any anticompetitive effects of vertical resale price maintenance will be corrected by the free market and competition. 259 They maintain that vertical price restraints will be
kept in check by interbrand competition. 260 Additionally, they argue that
vertical minimum price fixing instituted by a manufacturer must provide
some benefit to the market because manufacturers, without receiving some
benefit in return, have no desire to provide retailers with higher profit mar256.
See id.
257.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718-19.
See STONIER & HAGUE, supra note 255, at 316; see also Bums, supra note 240,
258.
at 913 (noting that vertical price maintenance leads to increased retail prices); Pitofsky,
supra note 254, at 1493 (arguing that manufactures may use RPM to keep wholesale prices
high and thus in the long run, consumer and manufacturer's interest are not in line with each
other). Additionally, as monopolistic firms exploit their position by setting the price of their
products at a point above that where the competitive market would justify, vertical price
restraints may also be used as a tool by monopolistic firms to allow them to more accurately
set monopolistic prices in the retail market. See J.R. Gould & B.S. Yamey, ProfessorBork
on Vertical Price Fixing, 76 YALE L.J. 722, 723 (1967) (arguing that vertical price maintenance leads to increased prices and lower output-two of the staples of a monopolistic firm).
259.
POSNER, supra note 21, at 22.
260.
BoRK, supra note 12, at 290 (stating that vertical restraints are checked by the
market as they have no effect on interbrand competition); POSNER, supra note 21, at 10, 22
(noting that almost all firms have perfectly elastic demand for their products as a result of
interbrand competition, and thus cannot take a monopolist position in the market; the market
power of the firm plays a key role in analyzing the possible anticompetitive effects of a
vertical price fixing scheme as firms who only supply a small number of the products in a
particular market are particularly subject to competition and thus cannot alter their price
without driving their customers to substitute brands). Professor Posner argues that interbrand
competition serves as a check because when a firm obtains a monopoly and is able to
achieve above normal profits, the above normal profits will provide other firms with an
incentive to enter the market and compete. POSNER, supra note 21, at 10. Additionally, if
substitutes are already available in the market, any increase in the price of a good by a firm
(who has elastic demand) will result in consumers substituting a rival brand. POSNER, supra
note 21, at 22. In both cases, the end result is that competition will drive prices back down
and destroy the monopoly. POSNER, supra note 21, at 10, 22.
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gins. 261 Finally, supporters of vertical price restraints maintain that even
though such restraints may be anticompetitive, they are still beneficial to
the market in the aggregate as the "cost" to the economy of the restraint
may not be more than the offsetting benefit consumers receive from its
presence.26 2 These arguments are short sighted for a number of reasons.
First, interbrand competition may not provide the check on the market
that theorists believe. Retail price competition may be harmful to manufacturers because it may put pressure on a manufacturer to reduce its wholesale
prices---decreasing its total return.263 Vertical minimum price maintenance
may easily be used to remedy this issue by allowing the manufacturer to
expressly control retail price competition. The Court in Leegin recognized
the danger such power posed by noting that vertical minimum price maintenance may facilitate horizontal cartels between manufacturers to eliminate
retail price competition.264 However, the Court ignored the very real possibility that even absent horizontal cartel agreements, vertical resale price
maintenance may lead to the tacit coordination of manufacturers to limit
retail price competition.2 65 If retail prices are visibly fixed by manufacturers, who largely lack any utility in retail price competition,266 price competition may be largely undercut by manufacturers who will prefer to maintain
the status quo and keep retail prices high.2 67 If interbrand competition is
limited by resale price maintenance, the fact that intramarket competition is
ignored by antitrust jurisprudence and almost completely restricted by vertical minimum price fixing becomes very damaging to the market, as intra-

BoRK, supra note 12, at 290 (noting that courts are less concerned with in261.
trabrand competition because manufacturers desire to minimize retail price competition).
Richard A. Posner, Vertical Restraints and Antitrust Policy, 72 U. In. L. REv.
262.
229 (2005). This argument in essences sets forth the theory that although vertical price restraints may be anticompetitive, they are not anticompetitive to the point where the economy
is made worse off in the aggregate, and thus a monopoly does not exist. Id
263.
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1606c, at 96-98 (1989).
264.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text (noting the Leegin Court's acknowledgement of this argument).
See AREEDA, supra note 263, $T 1606d-f, at 98-107.
265.
See supranote 261 and accompanying text.
266.
267.
See AREEDA, supra note 263, 71 1602d, 1606a, 1606b, at 31, 91, 96 (noting that
if resale price maintenance was practiced at all times in an industry when "fair trade" laws
permitted it, it was often practiced by many manufacturers). It was noted that manufacturers
may individually adopt vertical price restraints for "legitimate" reasons, or with the hope that
rival firms will do the same; either way, the end result is industry-wide price coordination
among manufacturers. See AREEDA, supranote 263, 7 1602d, 1606a, 1606b, at 31, 91, 96.
If many manufacturers adopted retail price maintenance, interbrand competition would be
reduced and manufacturers would have a reduced incentive to provide wholesale, or retail,
price cuts. See AREEDA, supra note 263, In 1602d, 1606a, 1606b, at 31, 91, 96.
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market competition is the only other means through which the market may
be kept competitive. 268
Additionally, the assumption that most manufacturers in the market
experience purely elastic demand and thus would not be able to take advantage of vertical minimum price fixing may ignore market realities. 269 As the
market has become more competitive, retailers and manufacturers seek additional means through which to maintain competitive advantages.270 One
such way that manufacturers and retailers have sought to achieve this end is
by segmenting the market.27' Market segmentation is a marketing concept
that recognizes that the needs and wants of consumers are all somewhat
different (or "heterogeneous").2 72 By dividing the market based on consumer needs and wants into "sub-markets," a firm may obtain a competitive
advantage by focusing on meeting the demands of one or many individual
sub-markets.2 73 Marketing segmentation will thus provide a firm with a
competitive advantage and in turn, make the demand for the goods sold or
manufactured by the company more inelastic.274 While marketing segmentation may benefit the market as consumers are better able to purchase
goods which more closely meet their needs and wants,275 the inelastic demand inherently formed by the practice also creates an opportunity, albeit a
small one, for a manufacturer to extract a small level of monopoly profits. 276 Further, as information technology and database marketing have
268.
Grimes, supranote 240, at 887.
269.
See supra note 260 for a discussion of this rationale.
See Judith McNamara & Lucy Cradduck, Can We ProtectHow We Do What We
270.
Do? A Considerationof Business Method Patents in Australia and Europe, 16 INT'L J.L. &
TECH. 96, 97 (2008) ("Businesses have an incentive to maintain any competitive advantage
and to protect good business models ... ").
271.
MICHAEL WEDEL & WAGNER A. KAMAKURA, MARKET SEGMENTATION:
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 3 (Jehoshua Eliashberg ed., 2d ed. 2000)
(noting that intramarket competition has become more important as brand selling and marketing segmentation practices have become widespread).
272.
WEDEL & KAMAKURA, supra note 271, at 3.
273.
WEDEL & KAMAKuRA, supra note 271, at 3.
274.
See WEDEL & KAMAKURA, supra note 271, at 3. As the firm is gearing its products to meet the needs of a particular sub-market, the demand for the good from that submarket will be increased. This will also make demand for the product more inelastic as the
fact that the product has been closely tailored to meet the needs of the sub-market will make
rival goods less attractive and thus less comparable substitutes. See WEDEL & KAMAKURA,
supra note 271, at 3. The existence of such "sub-markets," their effect on demand, and their
connection to antitrust jurisprudence was recognized by the Court in Brown Shoe Co. v.
UnitedStates, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
275.
See WEDEL & KAMAKuRA, supra note 271, at 3.
276.
See supra note 260 and accompanying text. While a sub-market may be small,
the widespread use of marketing segmentation may create a market environment where
many manufacturers are able to exploit a small monopoly on a single sub-market, but with
the aggregate effect being a significant amount of monopoly profits being achieved by the
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made it easier for marketers to identify and react to consumer needs and
wants, a real7 threat exists that firms may be able to achieve and sustain such
a position.1 1

Finally, advocates for eliminating the per se rule against resale price
maintenance argue that even if vertical minimum price restraints may increase prices to consumers, there is no reason to suspect that such a price
increase is anticompetitive, as benefits stemming from such practices will
likely outweigh any "costs" to the market.278 These advocates argue that
manufacturers adopt vertical minimum price fixing programs to ensure that
all retailers provide certain services and products, which add value to a
manufacturer's goods. 279 The problem with this argument is that resale
price maintenance advocates may be ignoring the very consumer welfare
they argue antitrust law is designed to protect.
Consumer welfare is tied to the level of "utility" consumers derive
from the market-the level of satisfaction a consumer is able to achieve
from his available financial resources. 280 The problem with the Court's
holding in Leegin is it relies on the view that consumer utility is maximized
solely by a perfectly efficient market with maximum output at the lowest
price possible.28 ' While this viewpoint may inore a number of market
functions from which consumers derive utility, 2 2 the problem with vertical
minimum price fixing is it directly impedes a clearly identified market practice from which consumers derive particular utility: discount retailing.28 3
market as a whole. Further, market segmentation may also make it easier for manufacturers
to sustain a competitive advantage as the small size of a sub-market may make competition
within the segment less attractive to competitors.
WEDEL & KAMAKURA, supra note 27 1, at 4.
277.
See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
278.
279.
BORK, supra note 12, at 290, 295-97 (arguing that even if such services as advertising, carrying a manufacturer's entire product line, and employing additional sales staff
increase the cost of a manufacturer's products, they also inherently add value to the products
which consumers realize). In this respect, it is argued the resale price maintenance allows
manufacturers to ensure that all retailers provide such value-added services and that retailers
who provide such services are not undercut by retailers who do not, but instead simply sell
the goods at a discount price. BORK, supra note 12, at 290, 295-97.
STONIER & HAGUE, supra note 255, at 34-35. See also BORK, supra note 12, at
280.
295-97.
See Bums, supra note 240, at 916.
281.
Bums, supra note 240, at 916-19 (noting that consumers also have shown that
282.
they derive utility from low prices, dealer fairness, decent wages and benefits for retail
workers, and business ethics in addition to creating an efficient market).
See generally Brief of Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation as
283.
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480). The popularity of discount retailing may be discerned
by noting that Wal-Mart, the nation's leading discount retailer, recorded net sales of nearly
$350 billion in 2006, approximately ten percent of all U.S. retail sales. 10-K REPORT FOR
WAL-MART STORES, INC., 1 ex.13 (March 2007); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL
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Resale price maintenance is particularly harmful to discount retailing because by definition, vertical minimum price fixing allows manufacturers to
set the minimum price at which a product may be sold in the retail market,
placing a cap on discount retailers' ability to compete via low prices. 284
Such a blatant impediment to discount retailing may not be justified as
many discount retailers are able to offer low prices not because they eliminate value-added services and act as "free-riders," but because their distribution system is more efficient than other retail firms.285
2.

The Majority Failedto Adequately Address Stare Decisis Concerns

In Leegin, the majority overruled a precedent case that had been on the
books for nearly one hundred years, but offered little explanation or justification for its decision in light of notions of stare decisis.286 Specifically, the
majority argued that the Sherman Act is a common law statute and that
Congress intended the Court to be free to shape antitrust policy so the law
would, "evolve with new circumstances and new wisdom., 287 Thus, the
Court found justification for its minimal adherence to stare decisis in
Leegin by citing that the doctrine has less weight in cases involving the
Sherman Act where the "general presumption
that legislative changes
288
force.,
less
has
Congress
to
left
be
should
Stare decisis involves a policy judgment by the Court as to whether or
not it is appropriate to overturn a precedent case and reflects the rationale
that in many cases, "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be

BENCHMARK REPORT FOR RETAIL TRADE AND FOOD SERVICES: JANUARY 1992 THROUGH
FEBRUARY 2005, at 8 tbl.4 (March 2005), available at http'/www.census.gov/prod/2005

pubs/br04-a.pdf.
284.
BORK,supra note 12, at 436.
285.
Pitofsky, supra note 254, at 1493. This argument largely undercuts the combating "free-riders" justification raised by the majority in Leegin. See Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2715 (2007); supra note 185 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the "free-rider" effect.
286.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2723-25. And, in discussing staredecisis, one legal authority has noted:
Stare decisis is a judicial policy, based on the principle that, absent powerful countervailing considerations, like cases should be decided alike in
order to maintain stability and continuity in the law. The doctrine is the
means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.
20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2007).
287.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2724 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485
U.S. 717, 732 (1988)).
288.
Id.at 2720 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
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settled than that it be settled right., 289 Such a policy promotes, "evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process., 290 The doctrine requires the Court consider the pragmatic and prudential effects of overruling an established rule
of law and compare the costs of affirming or overturning a settled case.291
The Court should not overturn prior holdings lightly, 292 especially when a
where
case involves issues of statutory interpretation, such as in Leegin,
2 93
Congress is free to change the Court's interpretation of the law.
In conducting its analysis, the majority erred by ignoring altogether
many of the traditional criteria utilized by the Court in considering the issue
of stare decisis in a particular case.294 In Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,295
the Court stated that in considering staredecisis, it will consider 1) whether
a case's central rule has been found unworkable, 2) whether the rule could
be removed without serious inequity to those who have relied on it, or
without significant damage to society, 3) whether the law's growth has left
the rule a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society, and 4) whether the
central premise of the case has so far changed as to render its central holding irrelevant or unjustifiable in dealing with the issue it addressed.296 Additionally, the Court will apply stare decisis with particular care when property or contract rights are implicated.297
First, the central ruling of Dr. Miles (per se rule against vertical minimum resale price maintenance) cannot be said to be unworkable. The per se
rule against vertical minimum price fixing was well settled law for nearly a
century. 298 The rule provided administrative ease and helped ensure judicial
consistency in the area of vertical price restraints, an area that may otherwise become quite muddied in light of the nature of vertical restraints and
See Khan, 522 U.S. at 20. Stare Decisis is not a "inexorable command," but
289.
represents a policy decision by the Court. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
290.
Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
291.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
292.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
111.Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
293.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2723294.
25 (2007). The Court offered no justification for this departure and only considered 1) that
the Court has exceptional power to shape the law under the Sherman Act, and 2) that Congress had never overtly acted to outlaw minimum resale price maintenance before. Id
505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life,
295.
Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
296.
297.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (citing Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,
429 U.S. 363 (1977)).
See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977).
298.
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their inability to be adequately judged under the rule of reason. 299 Additionally, the per se rule was not exclusively applied in the area of vertical restraints, rather the Court had provided an escape hatch for reasonable vertical restraints. The Colgate doctrine allowed reasonable vertical price restraints to be applied so long as no actual price fixing agreement was created. 3° °
Second, the significant reliance on the Dr. Miles rule has created a
market where its removal may harm both particular businesses and society
as a whole. Particularly, discount retailers, "have financed, structured, and
operated their businesses," in reliance on the Dr. Miles rule against vertical
minimum resale price maintenance. 30 1 Additionally, the dissent in Leegin
recognized that society has also relied on the Dr. Miles rule by investing in
shopping malls with discount retailer anchor tenants, locating their homes
near discount retailers, and relying on discount retailers for jobs.30 2 The
significant reliance on discount retailing by both society and discount retailers is particularly noteworthy as such reliance in both cases implicates
property rights and contract rights.30 3 Finally, society largely depends on
discount retailers for many of its shopping
needs-their loss would hurt
3 °4
both consumers and the retail economy.
299.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2734-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Muddying judicial analysis and increasing administrative costs may encourage some manufacturers to enter into
anticompetitive agreements as enforcement may become too costly or too difficult for a
plaintiff to win. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text; see also infra Part LV.C. 1.
300.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307-08 (1919). The Colgate
doctrine held that a manufacturer may set a minimum resale price for its goods and decline
to sell to any retailer that did not comply with his/her suggested prices. Id. This was found to
be fundamentally distinct from an agreement to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act.
Id. See also supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Colgate case.
Critics argue that the Colgate doctrine is difficult and costly for companies to apply and
often leaves them unable to take advantage of vertical price restraints as the risk of violating
the doctrine far outweighs the benefit a company may derive from the practice. Brief of
PING, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-19, Leegin Creative Leather Prods,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
301.
Brief of Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 5, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
302.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2735-36 (2007) (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting, inter alia,
that allowing resale price maintenance would increase the average yearly retail expenditures
of a family of four by $750 to $1000).
303.
See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). Arguably, retailers who
have invested in inventory, store locations, distribution centers and who employ significant
numbers of employees with unique benefits packages have both property and contract interests in their business. Additionally, private homeowners who purchased their homes near a
discount retailer (especially in small towns) also have property rights implicated by the
Leegin decision. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
304.
See supra note 283 (noting that Wal-Mart alone comprised approximately ten
percent of all retail sales in 2006). In addition to Wal-Mart, two other U.S. discount stores,
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Third, while the Court has systematically eroded the use of per se rules
in the area of vertical restraints, it cannot be said that a per se rule of illegality for vertical minimum retailprice maintenance has been discounted by
society. 30 5 First, Congress has acted repeatedly to preserve the Dr. Miles
rule by both declining to provide funding to the Justice Department to overturn the rule and by passing the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,
which repealed the Fair Trade Laws.3 °6 While the Leegin majority failed to
give this argument any credence, the Court had previously recognized that,
"Congress . . . has expressed its approval of a per se analysis of vertical
price restrictions by repealing the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts allowing fair trade pricing at the option of the individual States., 30 7 The Leegin
Court however, offered no justification for this abrupt change in its interpretation of Congress' actions. 30 8 Additionally, within four months of the
Leegin decision, Senators Herb Kohl and Joe Biden had already coAct,"
sponsored a bill titled the "Discount Pricing Consumer 3 Protection
9
which is expressly aimed at overturning the Leegin ruling. 0
Costco and Target, each recorded approximately $64 billion in sales in 2006, or approximately two percent of all retail sales in that year. 10-K REPORT FOR TARGET CORP., 1 ex. 13
(March 2007); 10-K REPORT FOR COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP., 1 ex. 13 (Oct. 2007); U.S.

CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL BENCHMARK REPORT FOR RETAIL TRADE AND FOOD SERVICES:
JANUARY 1992 THROUGH FEBRUARY 2005, at 8 tbl.4 (March 2005), available at

httpJ/www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/br04-a.pdf. Additionally, internet retail sales totaled
$170.8 billion in 2006, or approximately five percent of all retail sales that year. Helen
Leggatt, US.Online Retail Sales May Break $200 Billion Barrier, BIzREPORT, Aug. 1,
2007, http://bizreport.com/2007/08/us_onlineretailsales maybreak_200_billionbarrier.
html; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL BENCHMARK REPORT FOR RETAIL TRADE AND FOOD
SERVICES: JANUARY

1992

THROUGH FEBRUARY

2005, at 8 tbl.4 (March 2005), available at

http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/brO4-a.pdf.
305.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10-11, 18 (1997) (striking down the use of a
per se rule of illegality when judging vertical maximum price restraints); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18, 52, 59 (1977) (striking down the use of a per se
rule of illegality when judging vertical non-price restraints).
306.
Brief of The American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2-4, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (No.
06-480). The Fair Trade Laws allowed the states to pass trade laws allowing certain market
practices including, inter alia, vertical minimum resale price fixing. Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at
2723-24. The legislative history for the Act shows that Congress was aware that in repealing
the Fair Trade Laws it was installing Dr. Miles as the law of the land for vertical minimum
resale price maintenance. Brief of The American Antitrust Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2-4, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct.
2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2724; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n. 18.
307.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2724.
308.
Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Kohl Introduces "Discount Pricing Con309.
at
available
2007),
30,
(Oct.
Act"
Protection
sumer
http'//www.senate.gov/-kohl/press/07/09/2007A30814.html. See infra Part IV.C.3 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Senator Kohl's bill.
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Fourth, the central premise of Dr. Miles has not been clearly eroded
nor has it changed so much as to render its central holding irrelevant or
unjustifiable. While Dr. Miles did ultimately base its economic justifications for the per se rule of illegality on two economic premises which have
been discredited,31 ° modern economic analysis still instructs that the central
holding of Dr. Miles (a per se rule of illegality for vertical minimum price
fixing) is still sound policy. 311 While economists agree that there may be
beneficial uses for vertical minimum price maintenance, the Leegin majority wholly failed to show that vertical resale price restraints will not "always or almost always" tend to restrict competition through any empirical
data, instead relying entirely on an economic theory whose foundations are
as uncertain as the Court's ultimate holding in Leegin.312 The Court recognized in Khan, that it will not "lightly assume that the economic realities
underlying earlier decisions have changed," suggesting that it will overturn
prior antitrust holdings only when the "great weight" of evidence shows the
rule to be in error.3 13 Leegin seems to change the nature of that notion, suggesting that the Robert's Court does not require a "great weight" of evidence to overturn prior antitrust jurisprudence, but instead a lack of empirical data and widespread theoretical disagreement seems to be sufficient.314
Thus, a thorough analysis of commonly considered stare decisis criteria suggests that Dr. Miles was not ripe for the Court to strike down in
Leegin. At the very least, the majority wholly failed to give any weight to
considerable evidence of societal reliance on the one hundred year old
precedent. The majority justified its lack of stare decisis consideration by
citing that the doctrine has less weight when dealing with the Sherman Act,
as the Court is expected to shape the Act just as the common law.315 In
Funk v. United States,316 the Court considered its role in deciding whether
to adhere to an antiquated common law rule in light of Congress' ability to
change the law as well. 317 The Court argued that it need not wait for Congress to change the common law, but that the Court, if called upon to do so,
may, "decide [the issue] in accordance with present-day standards of wis310.
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404, 408 (1911)
(relying on the right of a retailer to alienate his own property as he sees fit by analogizing
vertical price fixing to horizontal price fixing to hold vertical minimum resale price maintenance per se illegal).
311.
See supra Part IV.B. 1.
312.
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,10 (1997);Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710-25. See
supra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
313.
See Khan, 522 U.S. at21.
314.
See Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2723-25; see supraPart IV.B. 1.
315.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2724.
316.
290 U.S. 371 (1933).
317.
Id. at 381-82. The Court was considering whether the spouse of the defendant is
a competent witness in a criminal case. Id.at 373.
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dom andjustice.' '318 This suggests that while the Court obviously has the
power to shape the common law, it also has a duty to consider the implications of mandating a substantial change in the law.3 19 Such a duty does not
affect the right of the Court to shape the common law, but simply requires
the Court, when acting as a lawmaking body, to fully consider the impact of
its decision, just as Congress or any other legislature has an inherent duty to
do. To ignore such effects would illogically counter the Court's preference
for encouraging the "evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development
of legal principles, foster[ing] reliance on judicial decisions, and contribut[ing] to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process," in
an area where the Court is charged with fully shaping the legal landscape,
where the Court's concern for such principles should be
and thus arguably,
3
at a zenith.
C.

1.

PRACTICAL IMPACT OF THE LEEGIN DECISION

Vertical Minimum PriceFixing: Per Se Legality?

After Leegin, vertical minimum price fixing agreements are no longer
subject to a rule of per se illegality, but rather, are now analyzed under the
"rule of reason. 3 21 Under the rule of reason, the fact-finder must analyze,
Id. at 382 (emphasis added). Contra Strout v. Burgess, 68 A.2d 241 (Me. 1949)
318.
(holding that a landlord-tenant common law issue was better left to the legislature to
change); Dunhan v. Milanowski, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696, 701 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (suggesting
that "change[s] in the common law [should be avoided] when there is no substantial body of
agreement that such change is necessary and when it is patent that such change can be better
effected by legislative action").
319.
See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text; see also State v. Culver, 129
A.2d 715, 721 (N.J. 1957) ("The nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of
law is applied it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and needs of the
times have not so changed as to make further application of it the instrument of injustice."
(emphasis added)).
320.
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). Though beyond the scope of this
paper, the Court's blatant lack of stare decisis consideration in Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 272325, and in Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2652 (2007), another
case from the Leegin term, may suggest a shift in the Court's stare decisis policy. In both
cases, stare decisis considerations were not fully considered in the majority decision and
were largely discounted by the majority under the guise that the particular issues at bar were
not entitled to the normal level of stare decisis scrutiny usually afforded prior holdings.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2734-37 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (identifying the majorities lack of a full
stare decisis analysis); Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2704 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (noting that there was no justification for the majority's departure from a normal stare decisis analysis in that case). This may evidence a lack of concern
for traditional stare decisis analysis by the Robert's Court, especially when dealing with
non-constitutional issues.
321.
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2725. See generally supra notes 34-39 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the rule of reason.
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on a case-by-case basis, all the facts and circumstances surrounding an alleged violation of the Sherman Act in deciding whether the conduct in
question is an unreasonable restraint on competition.3 22 Thus, implicit in the
Court's decision to subject a restraint to the rule of reason is the assumption
that the particular practice at issue may in fact be functionally analyzed and
restrained under the rule-a consideration the majority in Leegin took into
account.3 23 But was the majority correct in assuming that vertical minimum
resale price maintenance could be effectively policed under the rule of reason? Advocates for overturning Dr. Miles have long argued that all vertical
restraints should be completely lawful-or per se legal.324 In subjecting
vertical minimum resale price maintenance to the rule of reason, is it possible the Court granted their wish?
The rule of reason was created to provide the courts flexibility in judging business practices for Sherman Act violations; 325 however, such flexibility has made the rule difficult and costly to apply with any consistency. 326 First, discovery and pre-trial expenses are incredibly high in rule
of reason cases, as courts consider all the facts and circumstances involved
in the particular case at bar.327 Even though many cases settle before trial,328
the cost of pre-trial discovery is significant enough to prompt settlement, or
to simply price a victim of an anticompetitive practice out of achieving justice altogether.32 9
322.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text for a full description of the factors
considered by the rule of reason. The rule of reason is considered to be a legal "standard"
that allows for a more seasoned analysis of the restraint at issue, as opposed to bright-line
per se rules that render a practice illegal merely based on the type of restraint at issue. See
supranote 52. See generally Crane, supranote 44.
323.
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2719-20. The majority noted that while resale price maintenance does pose anticompetitive dangers, as courts gain experience with such practices and
in analyzing them under the rule of reason, they will be able to establish a litigation structure
in which the rule could pragmatically work to restrict only anticompetitive uses of vertical
price fixing. Id. at 2720.
324.
BORK, supra note 12, at 288 ("Analysis shows that every vertical restraint
should be completely lawful.").
325.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
326.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
327.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text noting the exceptional cost in discovering large number of documents, creating and analyzing statistical data, and in hiring experts both to review discovery evidence and to testify at trial.
328.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
329.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Such effects stemming from discovery costs may also encourage defendants to settle, even when the trade practice utilized by
the defendant is not actually anticompetitive as it may be less expensive for a defendant to
abandon an economically beneficial practice than to risk losing at trial and being subjected
to treble damages. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. In such cases, society also
suffers, as the market has become less efficient from the loss of the beneficial market practice. See supranote 44 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, it is not perfectly clear what criteria the court must use to
judge a practice under the rule or reason, how each criterion should be
judged, or how much weight to give each criterion considered.33 ° This fact
is further evidenced by the current legal division over how courts should
consider the market impact of a particular business practice, with the largest
debate stemming from whether a firm must have "market power" for a
practice to be found truly anticompetitive. 33 1 This division stems from the
economic argument that without market power, a firm could not raise prices
above competitive levels (to enjoy monopoly profits) without losing sales to
competitors. 332 The Leegin Court seemed to advocate a "market power"
requirement in the area of vertical minimum resale price maintenance cases
by stating that only where the practice becomes widely used in a market or
where a manufacturer has market power does minimum resale price maintenance pose a true threat of harming the economy.333 Such a requirement
may prove fatal to antitrust plaintiffs as scholars have recognized the difficulty a court would face in measuring and utilizing a firm's true market
power in a given case.33 4 Additionally, as proving market power involves
defining the relevant market in which to compute the defendant's actual
market share,335 increased use of niche marketing and marketing segmenta330.
See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917). In that
case, the Court argued that the court must consider, inter alia, the nature of the business at
issue, the applicable market both before and after the practice was instituted, the actual or
probable effect of the practice, and the reason for adopting the practice. Id.
See Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of
331.
Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 4-5, 30-32 (2000) (explaining
that three federal circuits require an unequivocal showing of market power, while four others
have not overtly required market power be proven, but have suggested that absent market
power a practice cannot be anticompetitive). Market power is defined as "the ability [of a
firm] to set [its] price above marginal cost." William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 939 (1981). See, e.g., United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948) (evidencing the market power requirement by
stating that in judging the market impact of a business practice under the rule of reason, "the
percentage of business controlled, the strength of the remaining competition, whether the
action springs from business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable development of the industry, consumer demand, and other characteristics of the market," are all
relevant (emphasis added)).
332.
See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 331, at 937.
333.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2719
(2007). The majority's market power requirement for vertical minimum price fixing to be
held anticompetitive was recognized by the Leegin dissent. Id. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
334.
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Court's invitation
to consider the existence of 'market power' .. . invites lengthy time-consuming argument[s]
among competing experts, as they seek to apply abstract, highly technical, criteria to often
ill-defined markets."); Landes & Posner, supra note 331, at 943.
335.
Landes & Posner, supra note 331, at 938.
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tion may further make defining the applicable market more difficult or near
impossible for a court to do with any certainty.33 6
Further, one of the main justifications for allowing vertical minimum
resale price maintenance, ensuring that all retailers provide retail services
that add value to a manufacturer's goods, is it may provide a perfect disguise for a monopolistic pricing scheme.3 37 Advocates for judging vertical
minimum price maintenance under the rule of reason argue that while such
promotional practices may increase the price of a good, they also add value
to a product, which customers purchasing the product will receive. 338 It is
this added utility that some advocates argue should be the crux of considering the nature of a firm's output, not the number of units produced or any
increase in the price of the goods sold. 339 However, if a firm had the ability
to exert monopolistic profits from consumers, it could justify its prices by
arguing that its promotional activities have increased the perceived value of
its products to justify its increased prices. For example, a firm could justify
increasing its prices to take advantage of monopolistic profits by claiming
that it is marketing its goods as "luxury items," and that high prices add
value to its products by making them seem more exclusive; or a monopolist
manufacturer could invest a negligible amount of money on advertising or
in-store displays to justify its claim that it has added value to its goods. 340
Additionally, experts have recognized that technological advances in distributional and marketing analysis have further magnified the risk that vertical
minimum price maintenance may be used anticompetitively by a company
who otherwise appears to be pursuing a legitimate business goal. 34 1 A significant problem is that in the area of vertical price restraints, courts cannot
consistently and accurately decide at what point a price becomes unreason336.
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that when
judging a manufacturer's "market power," the applicable market is often "ill-defined");
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972) ("[The courts] inability to
weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the economy
against promotion of competition in another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules."). See also supranotes 271-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of
market segmentation.
337.
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715. The dissent in Leegin noted: "How easily can
courts identify instances in which the benefits [of vertical minimum resale price maintenance] are likely to outweigh potential harms? My own answer is, not very easily." Id. at
2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
338.
BORK, supra note 12, at 295-97.
339.
See BORK, supranote 12, at 295-97.
340.
See generally Brief for The Consumer Federation of America as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 19-20, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.
Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
341.
Brief for Anderson Economic Group, LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007)
(No. 06-480).
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able.342 Thus, the fact that courts cannot easily measure a firm's market
power exacerbates the danger that these justifications pose, as a court may
be unable to truly discern whether such practices actually increase the value
of a 43manufacturer's goods, and thus may be a legitimate business prac3
tice.
Finally, litigation under the rule of reason is likely to lead to inconsistent judicial results in considering the same business practices. 344 Such
splits may inject uncertainty into business planning and reduce innovation
as it will be unclear what conduct will be allowed and what conduct will be
found to be anticompetitive. 345 The reason for such inconsistent results is
largely that the underlying economic data involved in rule of reason trials is
significantly complex and hotly debated.346 As most economists disagree

342.
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 345 (1982). The
Court advocated for analysis of vertical minimum resale price maintenance under a per se
rule of illegality by arguing that vertical price fixing:
[I]nvolves the power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow....
Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be
themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of
minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable
as fixed without placing on the government ... the burden of ascertaining day to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere
variationof economic conditions.
Id. (quoting United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927)) (emphasis
added).
343.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 331, at 943.
344.
AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 46, at 102-03 ("[C]ommentators still condemn the
rule [of reason] as indefinite and unworkable .... [T]he nebulous nature of the rule can lead
to inconsistent results.").
345.
Maricopa County Med. Soc 'y, 457 U.S. at 344 ("For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, [the Court has] tolerated the invalidation of some agreements
that a full-blown inquiry [under the rule of reason] might have proved to be reasonable.");
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972) ("Without the per se
rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case
what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act. Should Congress ultimately determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of law, it can, of course,
make per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases .... ").
346.
See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609 ("[C]ourts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems."); AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 46, at 103; Piraino, supra note 47, at
351-52. This point is further evidenced by the divergent economic justifications both the
majority and dissent offered in Leegin. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2705, 2714-16, 27-31 (2007) (citing the applicable economic discussions in both
the majority and dissenting opinions); see also Brief for Anderson Economic Group, LLC as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 15, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480) (noting that even with an ideal data set with accurate data, and no change in economic variables, statistical data may not be enough to prove
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about the economics at the base of a case, judges, juries, and lawyers, many
of whom have only a basic understanding of economics, cannot be expected
to render sound judgments.347 Thus, rule of reason cases are likely to result
in a "battle of the experts," with juries and judges and their elementary understanding of economics, being left to guess at who's theoretical approach
is the most sound.348
All these factors combine to show that the rule of reason is replete
with flaws, which raise doubt regarding its ability to engender sound decisions or identify anticompetitive uses of vertical minimum resale price
maintenance. Some economists have recognized the rule's flaws and have
attempted to improve the rule by introducing check-lists and question sets
designed to aid courts in distinguishing instances where anticompetitive
harms are more likely to appear from instances where only competitive
benefits are likely to materialize. 349 However, applying such guidelines
presents the same obstacles to courts as does a full blown economic analysis under the rule of reason. 350 Further, the expensive costs and incredible
risks involved with filing a suit under the rule of reason leave it far too
likely that a victim of an anticompetitive vertical minimum price maintenance scheme will decline to file suit altogether.35 1 Thus in the end, it appears as though the Court in Leegin may have granted the wish of many
by making the practice in
vertical minimum price maintenance advocates
352
effect (and perhaps intentionally)per se legal.

anticompetitive behavior at trial, and that courtroom statistical analysis has failed to keep
pace with advances in statistical analysis in the field of economics (citations omitted)).
AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 46, at 103 ("[Most economists do not agree on the
347.
competitive impact and consumer welfare effects of any given restraint. Thus, it is questionable whether different juries would yield consistent answers if presented with identical
facts."); POSNER, supra note 21, at 29-30 ("[C]ourts cannot readily determine when competition is socially wasteful on balance .... ).
348.
This point is evidenced by the fact that two distinct groups of economists each
filed a brief in the Leegin case, one on behalf of the Respondent and the other on behalf of
the Petitioner. Brief for Anderson Economic Group, LLC as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No.
06-480); Brief of Amicus Curiae Economists Supporting Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
349.
350.
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730; see also supra notes 329-31 and accompanying
text (discussing the difficulty judges, juries, and lawyers have in applying complex economic data).
351.
See supra notes 326-29 and accompanying text (discussing the risks and costs of
filing a rule of reason case).
352.
BORK, supra note 12, at 288 ("Analysis shows that every vertical restraint
should be completely lawful.").
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IncreasedRetail Prices,DecreasedRetail Innovation

The most obvious effect of the Leegin decision will be increased consumer prices and decreased distributional innovation. Many scholars have
recognized that vertical minimum price maintenance, "leads to higher, not
lower, consumer prices., 353 Empirical studies have confirmed such effects
of vertical minimum price maintenance, noting that vertical price fixing
may increase prices between as much as eighteen and twenty-seven percent.3 54 Proponents of vertical price fixing discount this effect by arguing
that while such promotional activities add to the cost of goods sold, they
also increase the perceived value of the goods sold and thus are not harmful
to consumers.355 The problem with such an argument is it again relies on
the view that above all else, consumers seek a perfectly efficient market-a
view that does not hold true in reality. 35 6 Consumers have clearly shown
their preference for low prices over all other retail services as evidenced by
the significant growth in popularity of discount retail outlets in the United
States.357 Such a fact is illustrated by considering that Wal-Mart's share of
all retail sales in 2006 accounted for approximately ten percent of all U.S.
retail sales.358 Further, even the Court has recognized that low prices "benefit consumers" and relied on that rationale in striking down the use of a per
se rule against vertical maximum price fixing.359
Further, scholars have noted that vertical minimum price maintenance
may be used by manufacturers to limit retail innovation by making it impossible for retailers to take advantage of lower operation costs by discounting prices.36 ° Vertical minimum price maintenance advocates largely
353.
Bums, supra note 27, 608 (noting that vertical minimum price fixing leads to
increased retail prices). See also AREEDA, supra note 263, 1604b, at 42 (noting that vertical
minimum price restraints tend to produce higher consumer prices than would otherwise be
the case); BORK, supra note 12, at 295 (citing that retail promotional activities which may be
encouraged through the use of resale price maintenance schemes tend to increase the cost of
goods sold); JR. Gould & B.S. Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical PriceFixing, 76 YALE
L.J. 722 (1967).
354.
153 CONG. REc. S13582-83 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kohl)
(citing studies conducting by the U.S. Department of Justice prior to the Fair Trade Laws
being repealed).
355.
See BORK, supra note 12, at 295-97.
356.
See Burns, supranote 238, at 605-07.
357.
See Brief of Respondent at 18-19, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480).
358.
See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
359.
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (quoting Al. Richfield Co. v.
USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990)) (arguing that because low prices benefit
consumers, it is difficult to maintain that vertical maximum price fixing could harm consumers).
360.
See Harbour, supranote 244, at 991-92 (citing Steiner, supra note 249, at 424).
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argue that with the size and market power of many of today's discount retailers, further innovation in retailing will occur as these companies will be
able to fight manufacturer efforts to fix minimum retail prices.361 The problem with such an argument is it ignores the likelihood that future innovations in the field of retailing may seek to be implemented not by these now
super-retailers, but by small retailers who will not have the same exceptional market power.362 One retail segment that may suffer significantly in
such an environment is that of online retailing, a retail segment that competes largely on price, 363 and has become a popular form of retailing in the
United36 States, accounting for $170.8 billion in consumer spending in
2006.
3.

CongressionalReaction: Could Leegin Reshape the Sherman Act Forever?

When the Court overturned a one hundred-year-old precedent in
Leegin, the holding of which had long formed one of the most central underpinnings of the competitive market in the United States (i.e. price competition),365 congressional reaction became an almost certainty. Striking
down Dr. Miles represented a significant shift in the economic policy of the
United States, the effects of which are both unclear and largely debated by
economists. 366 While a sect of economic theorists may have called some of
the underpinnings of the Dr. Miles rule into question, the pragmatics, administrative concerns, and public favor (which would have been more obvious had the Court fully considered stare decisis concerns) may largely
367
trump the Court's view that a shift in the common law was appropriate.
In fact, the Court has recognized that shaping economic policy is better left
to Congress considering its, "institutional capacity for gathering evidence
and taking testimony," and thus Congress' ability to analyze the effects of a
change in economic policy, "far exceeds [that of the Court' s]y,368
361.
153 CONG. REC. S13,583 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
See id.
362.
363.
Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael D. Smith, FrictionlessCommerce? A Comparison
ofInternet and ConventionalRetailers, 46 MGMT. Sci. 563, 563-65, 572 (2000).
364.
Helen Leggatt, US. Online Retail Sales May Break $200 Billion Barrier,
BIZREPORT, Aug. 1, 2007, httpJ/bizreport.com/2007/08/usonline-retail_sales_may break_
200 billionbarrier.html (noting in addition that online retail sales are expected to reach
$200 billion in 2007).
365.
See supra Parts IV.B.2, IV.C. 1.
366.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
367.
See supra Parts IV.A-C. 1.
368.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972) ("If a decision is to be
made to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy for greater competition in an-
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Within four months of the Leegin decision, a bill had already been introduced in the Senate to overturn the case.369 Introduced by Senator Kohl
of Wisconsin, the bill seeks to amend Section 1 of the Sherman Act by adding that, "Any contract, combination, conspiracy or agreement setting a
minimum price below which a product or service cannot be sold by a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor shall violate [the Sherman Act]."37 ° The
bill overtly stated as its purpose, "to correct the Supreme Court's mistaken
interpretation of the Sherman Act in the Leegin decision; and to restore [the
per se rule against vertical minimum resale price maintenance]. 37' In addition, the bill cited that economic studies have shown that the Dr. Miles rule
has led to lower prices, which promotes consumer welfare, and noted that
prior to the repeal of the Fair Trade Laws, vertical minimum price maintenance schemes were shown to increase consumer prices between eighteen
and twenty-seven percent.3 72
The introduction of such a bill and the 5-4 decision in Leegin evidence
how widespread disagreement over economic policy, concerns over the
ability of courts to administer the antitrust laws, and the difficulty with
which the effects of a shift in antitrust policy may be discerned, has rendered the task of changing antitrust jurisprudence a trying and complex
undertaking. 373 While the Sherman Act was initially designed as a common
law statute to which the Court was to give shape, contemporary economic
theory and both the size and diversity of the United States' marketplace
may have finally sounded the call for a revision of the Sherman Act.374 As
Congress is more adept at "gathering evidence and taking testimony," it is
in a far better position to weigh all the applicable evidence and create a
more comprehensive antitrust legislation than the Supreme Court.375 Such
an undertaking would improve consumer welfare by making trials cheaper
other portion this.., is a decision that must be made by Congress and not by private forces
of the courts .... [C]ourts are ill-equipped and ill-situated for such decision-making. To
analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless data that
would surely be brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the delicate judgment on the
relative values to society of competitive areas of the economy, the judgment of the elected
representativesofthe people is required." (emphasis added)).
369.
Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S.2261, 110th Cong. (2007).
370.
Id. at § 3(a).
371.
Id.at § 2(b).
372.
Id. at § 2(a).
373.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007);
Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S.2261, 110th Cong. (2007).
374.
Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
375.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 628 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
See also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982) (noting that
price fixing arrangements clearly ran counter to the Sherman Act); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-22 (1940) (arguing that if certain price fixing schemes
are to be allowed, Congress must legislate such a shift in antitrust policy).
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and
and less complex, which would result
37 6 in more consistent judgments
provide stability to the marketplace.
Revamping the Sherman Act may be done in a number of ways, each
with their own benefits and drawbacks. First, Congress may clearly define
the factors through which the courts should judge particular practices (creating "elements" to judge each violation), simplifying judicial analysis under the rule of reason. 377 While such a change would offer both precision
and stability, it may be slow to react to changes in the marketplace or economic theory, a major concern of Congress when the Sherman Act was
originally passed.378 Second, just as Senator Kohl sought to do, Congress
may simply choose to classify certain practices as per se illegal or per se
legal, and leave the remainder subject to a classic rule of reason analysis.3 79
Such an approach again offers precision and stability, a bit more flexibility,
but is inherently over and under-inclusive. 380 Finally, Congress may simply
shift the burden of proof in some rule of reason trials to the defendant.38 '
In a typical rule of reason case, the plaintiff alleging an anticompetitive practice must first prove that the defendant's conduct is anticompetitive
by introducing proof that the practice at issue is anticompetitive in light of
traditional rule of reason criteria. 3822 The "quick look" approach modifies the
See supranotes 325-29, 344-48 and accompanying text.
376.
Some economists have attempted to compile such a listing of elements for judi377.
cial analysis of vertical resale price maintenance. See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). While many argue that listing such elements does not improve the ability of
judges, juries, or lawyers to digest and consider complex economic data, it certainly may
simplify the law to the point where much of the economic analysis may ultimately be removed from the equation for the fact-finder. See id
378.
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (recognizing that the Court
was given broad power to shape the Sherman Act so that the Act may evolve with modem
economic theory and understanding); Nat'l Soc'y ofProfl Eng'rs,435 U.S. at 688.
379.
See Nat'! Soc'y of Prof'! Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688; Discount Pricing Consumer
Protection Act, S. 2261, 110th Cong. (2007).
380.
See Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2727 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that vertical
minimum price fixing has both pro and anticompetitive consequences). See also supranote
52 discussing the over and under-inclusive nature of per se rules.
381.
See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). Such an approach
is often referred to as a "quick-look" test. James A- Keyte, What it is and How it is Being
Applied: The "Quick Look" Rule of Reason, 11 ANTITRUST 21, 21 (Summer 1997). Essentially, the "quick-look" is a "truncated rule of reason [test] that has characteristics of both the
per se and full rule of reason approaches." Id.
382.
Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role
for the FederalCourts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 359 (2000). In such a case, the exceptionally
large costs inherent in a rule of reason trial, and which serve as a major deterrent to plaintiffs
seeking to bring a case, are completely placed on the plaintiff's shoulders, regardless of the
nature of the defendant's conduct. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (noting the
significant costs of litigating may bar many victims from filing an antitrust suit under the
rule of reason case).
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rule of reason by creating a presumption that certain practices are anticompetitive in every case. 383 The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove
that the challenged practice has procompetitive justifications. 384 If the defendant can show procompetitive justifications exist, the court will then
conduct a classic rule of reason trial to decide whether or not the practice is
truly anticompetitive.38 5 Such a presumption may be particularly beneficial
in analyzing vertical minimum price fixing, as the ability of the courts 386
to
identify anticompetitive uses of the practice may be unusually difficult.
Additionally, while it may be argued that such a test may afford an opportunity for plaintiffs to shift the significant cost of trial onto the defendant,
thereby encouraging a defendant to settle and abandon a possibly procompetitive practice, such an effect could be eliminated by mandating that if a
defendant prevails in proving procompetitive justifications, the plaintiff be
liable for the defendant's court costs and attorney's fees. This approach
would allow the Sherman Act to remain flexible through its traditional
common law approach. 387 Additionally, adopting such a test would be less
over and under-inclusive then adopting per se rules of legality and illegality. 388 The only downside to adopting a "quick look" test is that it may result in a classic rule of reason trial. 389 However, the "quick look" rebuttable
presumption may sufficiently mitigate the flaws inherent in a rule of reason
trial by requiring the defendant first show a procompetitive justification for
its conduct before a full-blown economic and market analysis must be conducted under the rule of reason. 3

383.
James A. Keyte, What it is and How it is Being Applied: The "Quick Look"
Rule of Reason, 11 ANTITRUST 21, 21 (Summer 1997).
384.
Id.
385.
Id.
386.
See supra Part IV.C.1; see also Brief for the American Antitrust Institute as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28-30, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480) (supporting the adoption of a "quick look"
analysis in judging vertical minimum price fixing).
387.
See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
388.
See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2727
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that vertical minimum price fixing has both pro
and anticompetitive consequences). See also supra note 52 noting the inherent over and
under-inclusive nature of per se rules.
389.
See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text and Part IV.C. I discussing the
flaws in a classic rule of reason analysis and in using the rule of reason to police vertical
minimum resale price maintenance.
390.
See Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust
Rolefor the FederalCourts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 359-60 (2000).
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court erred in overturning Dr. Miles and its long-held
rule that vertical minimum resale price maintenance should be subject to a
rule of per se illegality. First, the majority erred in solely relying on economic theories, which are based on a number of assumptions about the
market that may or may not prove accurate, to argue that vertical minimum
price fixing is not "always or almost always" anticompetitive. At the very
least, the Court should have offered empirical data to support its economic
assumptions. Further, the Court failed to consider how vertical price fixing
is likely to be used, specifically, if procompetitive uses of vertical minimum
price fixing are even practical and likely to be implemented in actuality.
Additionally, the Court erred by discounting the importance of intramarket
competition and the fact that vertical minimum price fixing allows manufacturers to virtually eliminate it from the market, an important fact as intermarket competition, when subject to vertical minimum price restraints,
may not provide the check on the market some theorists may suggest. Specifically, some modem competitive practices, such as marketing segmentation, have impacted intermarket competition by making consumer demand
for a good more inelastic and in turn, increasing the likelihood that vertical
price restraints may be used to absorb monopoly profits. Finally, the Court
failed to lend any real credence to stare decisis considerations, many of
which advocated that Dr. Miles and its per se rule against vertical minimum
price fixing should be retained.
Further, the practical impact that Leegin is likely to have both on the
market and antitrust enforcement also evidences the Court's error in striking down Dr. Miles. Most importantly to consumers, the Leegin case will
almost certainly increase retail prices and decrease retail innovation. Such a
result is likely to prove unpopular as consumers have overwhelmingly
shown their support and preference for discount retailing. Additionally, it is
unlikely that anticompetitive uses of vertical minimum price fixing can be
effectively policed under the rule of reason. The rule of reason has been
shown to have serious flaws, which render analysis under it expensive, inefficient, and worst of all, inconsistent. Further, the rule of reason may not be
able to detect anticompetitive uses of vertical minimum price restraints at
all. Finally, considering the shortcomings of the Court's decision and the
traditional support for the per se rule against vertical minimum price maintenance, Leegin is likely to trigger a congressional backlash which at the
very least may overturn the Court's holding, but which may have more far
reaching implications. The Leegin decision and the complex nature of the
modern market may suggest that it is time for Congress to finally rethink
the Sherman Act and introduce a more comprehensive antitrust legislation.
So while the Court has today won its battle against vertical restraints, the
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war between the Court and Congress over the future of modem antitrust
policy may now be right on the horizon.
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